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Daniel A. Crane 63 Vand. L. Rev. 675 (2010)
Private litigation is the predominant means of antitrust
enforcement in the United States. Other jurisdictions around the
world are increasingly implementing private enforcement models.
Private enforcement is usually justified on either compensation or
deterrence grounds. While the choice between these two goals
matters, private litigation is not very effective at advancing either
one. Compensation fails because the true economic victims of most
antitrust violations are usually downstream consumers who are too
numerous and remote to locate and compensate. Deterrence is
ineffective because the time lag between the planning of the violation
and the legal judgment day is usually so long that the corporate
managers responsible for the planning have left their corporate
employer before the employer internalizes the cost of the violation.
Private litigation needs to be reconceptualized entirely and
redirected toward a forward-looking, problem-solving approach to
market power issues.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States is unique in the world insofar as private
enforcement of the antitrust laws vastly outstrips public enforcement.
There are roughly ten private federal cases for every case brought by
675
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the Department of Justice or Federal Trade Commission.' Almost all
of these private cases are oriented exclusively toward damages. While
the plaintiff usually asks for an injunction against further misconduct,
everyone understands that the case is all about the treble damages or,
more likely, the settlements that the defendants inevitably pay if the
case survives summary judgment.2
Although most other countries follow a model that relies
primarily on governmental antitrust enforcement, in many
jurisdictions there is a surge of interest in expanding private rights of
action for damages.8 Most prominently, the European Commission
released a White Paper in 2008-essentially a blueprint for further
action by the Commission-calling for expanded private antitrust
enforcement within the European Union.4 Notably, while proclaiming
the need for expanded private enforcement, the White Paper seems to
recoil in horror at the possibility of following a U.S. blueprint. On
virtually every major aspect of private litigation-including standing,
discovery, claim aggregation, and damages-the White Paper argues
for an approach that essentially rejects the U.S. position.5
In many other jurisdictions, private enforcement is either well
under way or under active discussion.6 As with the European Union,
however, most movements toward private enforcement reflect deep
ambivalence about the U.S. model.
In this Article, I argue that efforts to correct the perceived
infirmities of the U.S. private enforcement system by tweaking the
mechanics of enforcement-standing rules, discovery principles, claim
aggregation mechanisms, damages rules, and the like-are futile. The
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Earlier drafts of this paper were
presented at workshops at the University of Virginia, William & Mary, the University of
Michigan, the University of Chicago, and the European University Institute. Thanks to
Christopher Lentowski for very helpful research assistance.
1. See Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1179 (2008).
2. In the current system, the possibilities for injunctive relief are slim. Only about
eighteen private antitrust cases go to trial every year in the federal system, out of about 800
cases that reach a final disposition. See Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 35 n.188 (2008). Even assuming that half of these cases succeed at trial, that is only
about nine cases a year which would even be candidates for permanent injunctive relief. Of
course, it is possible that the parties would enter into a settlement agreement calling for the
entry of a stipulated injunction, but such settlements are exceedingly rare in private cases.
3. See AM. ANTITRUST INST., PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT: ADDING TO THE COMPLEXITY? (2009)
[hereinafter "AAI REPORT"].
4. Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on Damages Actions for
Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165 final (Apr. 2, 2008) [hereinafter "EU White
Paper"].
5. See infra text accompanying notes 108-122.
6. See AAI REPORT, supra note 3.
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shortcomings of private enforcement are existential, not technical.
They go to foundational assumptions about the goals and purposes of
antitrust law and competition policy. Private antitrust in the United
States has rarely advanced the two assumed goals of private
enforcement: deterrence and compensation. As other jurisdictions
around the world consider adopting a private enforcement model, they
should begin by reevaluating the goals of private enforcement. Only
once the goals are properly specified does it make any sense to discuss
the more technical implementation details.
To critique the U.S. system of private litigation is not to call for
a governmental monopoly of antitrust enforcement, the de facto rule
in most countries. Those who distrust private economic monopolies
should also distrust public governmental monopolies. A system of
private enforcement allows for decentralized decisionmaking and
individualized bargaining. It supplies a set of "on the street" enforcers
closer to the relevant problems, along with enhanced enforcement
resources and continued enforcement during downturns in public
enforcement. In the United States, private antitrust enforcement
should be retained, but reconceived. In the European Union and the
developing antitrust world, private antitrust enforcement should be
enhanced, but designed with the failures of the U.S. system in mind.
This Article suggests a framework for reconceiving the role of
private enforcement. Part I argues that the goals of private
enforcement need to be reconceptualized at a fundamental level.
Compensation and deterrence, the two assumed goals of antitrust law,
are not viable in most cases. Compensation fails because the true
economic victims of most antitrust violations are usually downstream
consumers who are too numerous and remote from the violation to
locate and compensate. Deterrence is ineffective because the time lag
between the planning of the violation and the legal judgment day is
usually so long that the corporate managers responsible for the
planning have left their corporate employer before the employer
internalizes the cost of the violation.
Part II argues that the most compelling reason to allow private
antitrust enforcement is to set the stage for individualized bargaining
over problems of market power and negotiated, forward-looking
solutions. The proposed approach extends beyond the familiar, and
often ineffective or superfluous, practice of granting injunctions
against continuing violations. Indeed, it seeks to dispense with the
need for binary fault-based adjudication, and instead orients the legal
decisionmaker toward policing market problems from a problem-
solving perspective. Reorienting private antitrust enforcement to serve
2010] 677
HeinOnline  -- 63 Vand. L. Rev. 677 2010
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
this objective will require a comprehensive reconceptualization of the
role of the private remedy.
Part III briefly considers the future of private antitrust
litigation and proposes some steps that could be taken to enhance
private litigation's effectiveness in serving antitrust's ultimate goal-
the advancement of consumer welfare. Although it is unlikely that the
United States will abandon its compensation- and deterrence-oriented
private litigation system any time soon, a number of modest steps
have already been taken to experiment with the problem-solving
approach. Moreover, it is not unrealistic to expect that emerging
antitrust jurisdictions could undertake some experimentation of their
own before their private enforcement systems harden into the inertia
of custom.
I. THE FAILURE OF THE COMPENSATION AND DETERRENCE GOALS
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the private
right of action for treble damages under the antitrust laws serves two
purposes: compensating injured victims of unlawful conduct and
attracting enforcement resources to supplement the government's
deterrence-oriented efforts.7 Unfortunately, modern private antitrust
enforcement does not serve either one of these objectives very well.
A. Compensation
From a political perspective, it is important to pay lip service to
the notion that private antitrust remedies exist to compensate people
injured by wrongdoers.8 Recently, the European Commission released
7. See, e.g., Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 572 n.10
(1982) ("Congress created the treble-damages remedy ... precisely for the purpose of
encouraging private challenges to antitrust violations. These private suits provide a significant
supplement to the limited resources available to the Department of Justice for enforcing the
antitrust laws and deterring violations." (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344
(1979))); Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 636 (1981) (referring to
deterrence as "one of the important purposes of the treble-damages action under § 4 of the
Clayton Act"); Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978) (stating that "§ 4 [of the
Clayton Act] has two purposes: to deter violators and deprive them of 'the fruits of their
illegality,' " and "to compensate victims of antitrust violations for their injuries." (citations
omitted)); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977) (asserting that compensation and
deterrence are the twin goals of § 4 of the Clayton Act); see also Phillip Areeda, Antitrust
Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1127 (1976) (stating that two
purposes of private antitrust enforcement are compensation and deterrence).
8. The framers of the Sherman Act justified the treble-damages remedy as necessary to
achieve compensation for injured victims of the trusts. Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the
Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 871, 911-35 (1999).
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HeinOnline  -- 63 Vand. L. Rev. 678 2010
PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
a White Paper calling for increased private antitrust enforcement in
Europe.9 The White Paper dutifully reported that "full compensation
is .. . the first and foremost guiding principle" of private antitrust
litigation and that "[m]ore effective compensation mechanisms mean
that the costs of antitrust infringements would be borne by the
infringers, and not by the victims and law-abiding businesses."10 If one
is trying to sell a new private enforcement system to a skeptical
public, this is certainly the right tactic.
Alas, private antitrust litigation does a very poor job of
compensating injured victims. Antitrust injuries are conventionally
classified into two categories, static and dynamic.n Static injuries
concern the effects on consumers from an increase in price attendant
to the exercise of monopoly power.12 Dynamic injuries arise when a
dominant firm stifles innovation or new product development.13
Private antitrust litigation could, in theory, attempt to compensate
injured victims for both types of losses, but it fails at both tasks.
1. Static Injuries
In a static model of competitive injury, the clearest social cost
of an antitrust violation falls upon a class of people who will often not
be able to sue-those who stopped purchasing from the defendant
because the price increased too much. When a firm acquires market
power through collusion or by excluding rivals, it typically will raise
its price to a monopoly level. Two classes of consumers suffer harm.
First, some consumers who would otherwise have purchased the
product are no longer willing to purchase it at the higher price. Hence,
they purchase a second-best preference as a substitute. These
consumers' loss is a deadweight loss-a class of forgone transactions
that should, in a competitive market, have taken place.14 Economists
9. EU White Paper, supra note 4, at 3.
10. Id. Interestingly, the white paper listed deterrence as a merely secondary goal for
private enforcement. Id. In the United States, the situation is arguably the opposite. See William
H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1445, 1452 (1985)
(arguing that the Supreme Court has elevated deterrence over compensation as a value for
private antitrust enforcement).
11. To be more precise, antitrust scholars generally speak about "static efficiency and
dynamic efficiency." See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in
Antitrust Law, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 581, 600 (2009). The loss of one or other of those
forms of efficiency due to anticompetitive injury is what I call static or dynamic injury.
12. See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 19-20 (3d ed. 2005).
13. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOzO L. REV. 247
(2007).
14. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 30 (1989).
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identify deadweight loss as the primary social cost of anticompetitive
behavior.' 5 It is a social cost because it results in a misallocation of
scarce social resources. Customers must buy their second-best, rather
than their most-favored, preferences.
The second class of harm accrues to consumers who continue to
purchase the product at the higher price. Their injury is a wealth
transfer from consumers to producers.16 This is not necessarily
economically inefficient, since it merely transfers money from one
person to another and does not directly affect the deployment of scarce
resources.' 7 There is nothing that says a priori that the money is
better off in the hands of consumers than the producers. For example,
if the price-fixed product is a luxury good, then price-fixing may act as
a progressive tax on rich consumers for the benefit of poor artisans.
Private parties who sue antitrust defendants typically do not
sue to vindicate the interests of the consumers who stopped buying the
goods because they were too expensive. Instead, only the purchasers
who did buy and actually incurred an overcharge bring antitrust
claims.'8 For example, imagine the difficulty of representing a class of
purchasers who stopped buying vitamins because of a vitamins cartel
or, even worse, who never started buying vitamins because of
excessive prices. How could one prove who the consumers were or
quantify their injury? It is much easier to recover damages on behalf
of purchasers who made the purchase but paid too much. In this case,
the formula is simply to posit a but-for price and use the difference
between the actual price and the but-for price as damages.19
The fact that private damages are automatically trebled under
the Clayton Act 2 0 (save for a few exceptional cases) is no reason to
believe that deadweight losses are being recovered after all. One could
rationalize the treble damages allowance as necessary to capture a set
of damages that are difficult to identify or recover in private litigation,
15. KENNETH G. ELZINGA & WILLIAM BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW
AND ECONOMICS 6-7 (1976); William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 652, 653 (1983).
16. Hovenkamp, supra note 14, at 9-11.
17. To the extent that would-be monopolists expend resources trying to effectuate wealth
transfers, such expenditures may be inefficient. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw 13 (2d ed.
2001). However, private enforcers do not sue to recover such wasted expenditures.
18. See Hovenkamp, supra note 14, at 36; Landes, supra note 15, at 675-76.
19. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396, 399 (1906)
(holding that damages in overcharge cases are the "difference between the price paid and the
market or fair price").
20. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
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including the deadweight loss. 21 Although this may be an argument
for the deterrent purpose of treble damages, it is not a particularly
good argument for their compensatory function. A consumer who
recovers treble damages may be entirely different from a consumer
who forgoes the relevant purchase after the price increase. Private
antitrust enforcement tends to focus on a set of purchasers and
injuries that are secondary in the hierarchy of antitrust concerns.
Private enforcement does not seek compensation for, nor does it
meaningfully analyze, the key concern of deadweight loss. 22
Assume, however, that compensating for wealth transfer is a
goal of antitrust every bit as important as preventing deadweight
losses.23 How well does private antitrust enforcement do on this score?
For consumers, the answer is "not very well." The widely distributed
nature of the overcharge and the difficulty in locating the real
economic victim work against this goal.
To see why private enforcement fails at compensating for
wealth transfer, consider the chain of loss-causation in a typical
antitrust claim. A dominant durable medical equipment manufacturer
enters into exclusive dealing contracts with hospitals and the group
purchasing organizations ("GPOs") that bargain on the hospitals'
behalf.24 The exclusive contracts unlawfully lock out potential
competitors and allow the manufacturer to charge a monopoly price.
In the first instance, the monopoly overcharge is paid by distributors
that stock goods for the hospitals. The hospitals have complex billing
arrangements with the distributors in which some, but not all, of the
overcharge is passed on to the hospital. The hospitals then pass along
some, but not necessarily all, of this overcharge to their patients.
The patients are often not directly affected by the overcharge.
This is because the patients' co-pay for using hospital services remains
initially unaffected; their insurance companies pay the bulk of the
passed-on overcharge. The insurance companies may eventually
21. See generally Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust 'Treble" Damages Really Single Damages?,
54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115 (1993).
22. On the other hand, public enforcers typically seek penalties, not damages, and do not
have to establish standing to sue or make their case on behalf of any particular class of
purchasers. Rather, they can focus on the overall social harm of the conduct and pursue remedies
designed to deter and prevent such conduct in the future.
23. See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 911-35 (1999)
(arguing, based on legislative history, that Congress intended the Sherman Act to prevent
wealth transfers from consumers to producers).
24. See, e.g., Del. Valley Surgical Supply, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 523 F.3d 1116 (9th
Cir. 2008); Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 2009-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 76, 461 (E.D. Mo. 2008);
Natchitoches Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. v. Tyco Int'l, 247 F.R.D. 253 (D. Mass. 2008).
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increase their premiums or co-pays, but these future increases may
fall on a different set of insured than those who received monopoly-
priced services. For large classes of patients such as the indigent and
the elderly, any overcharge borne by the hospitals may be passed onto
taxpayers in the form of Medicare, Medicaid, or direct hospital
subsidization. This complex scenario has countless analogs in the
world of manufacturing, sales, and distribution. Thus, a monopoly
overcharge often produces numerous ripples in the economy.25
The law has a practical answer to the above scenario: just as a
person can be damaged without legal injury,26 so also can a person be
legally injured without actual damage. Under the current U.S. system
of standing, a private plaintiff who is a direct purchaser from an
overcharging monopolist has a right of action to recover the full extent
of the overcharge, even if the plaintiff passes on the entire overcharge
downstream and therefore suffers no economic damage. 27 Conversely,
an indirect purchaser bearing the real economic brunt may recover
nothing.28 Proposals for reform would grant some standing to indirect
purchasers, 29 but even that would not necessarily result in the real
economic victims being compensated. The question remains: Who are
the proper indirect purchasers? Are they the hospitals, patients,
insurance companies, or taxpayers? Figuring out which, if any, of
these groups suffered the real economic harm is often difficult or
impossible given the complexity and variability of the relevant
economic relationships.
This brings us to the second problem with pursuing a
compensation goal. Even if the real economic victims of an overcharge
as a class could be identified, identifying the actual people who
25. See Robert G. Harris & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A
Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269, 276 (1979) ("[In a multiple-level chain of
distribution, passing on monopoly overcharges is not the exception: it is the rule.").
26. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 103 n.5 (1998) (recognizing the
principle of damnum absque injuria-harm without legal injury).
27. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
28. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). It bears noting that the Illinois Brick and
Hanover Shoe rules only apply in federal lawsuits. In California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S.
93 (1989), the Supreme Court held that federal antitrust law does not preempt state antitrust
laws that allow indirect purchaser suits. A number of states have allowed such indirect
purchaser suits.
29. The congressionally appointed Antitrust Modernization Commission recently made a
recommendation for legislative reforms that would overrule both Hannover Shoe and Illinois
Brick and allow for removal of state cases to federal court and consolidation of all damages
claims as to a particular violation. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 2 (2007), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edulamc/report
recommendation/chapter2.pdf. The court would then make a determination of what the total
monopoly overcharge was, treble the overcharge, and allocate the damages pot to the different
plaintiffs based on the proportion of their individual injuries to the total.
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suffered injury and issuing them a check is often so expensive that
administrative costs swallow the entire recovery. 30 The U.S.
experience is instructive. Realizing that the costs of issuing checks to
the members of the injured class were often prohibitive, creative
lawyers invented other ways in which the injured consumers could be
compensated. For example, the settling lawyers would have the
defendants agree to issue coupons to class members. These coupons
could be used for future purchases from the defendants. The coupons
often go unclaimed and unused, however. 31 Further, the issuance of
coupons may simply encourage the defendants to raise the price of
their products, thus wiping away any compensatory benefit, or it may
cause inefficient overconsumption by the compensated class. 32 In 2005,
Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act, 33 which was designed
in part to rein in perceived abuses in coupon settlements. Still, after
lawyers' fees and administrative fees are accounted for, each
consumer's share of the recovery is negligible, even though the harm
to the class is great. 34
Despite these obstacles, legal scholars continue to claim that
private antitrust enforcement provides meaningful compensation. In a
recent study, Professors Robert Lande and Joshua Davis provided an
empirical analysis of forty recent private antitrust cases that resulted
in substantial damages awards. 35 They concluded that private
antitrust litigation "very significantly compensates victims of illegal
corporate behavior and is almost always the only way these victims
can receive redress."36 One may question how much compensation of
injured victims actually occurred. The forty cases resulted in the
recovery of $18.006 to $19.639 billion in cash, depending on how the
30. See Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21
STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1590 (1969) (arguing that "[t]he class action, save for large institutional
purchasers, is a delusion. There is no feasible method of locating and reimbursing the consumer
who several years ago may have paid too much for a toothbrush. . . .").
31. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Need to Study Coupon Settlements in Class Action
Litigation, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1395, 1396-97 (2005) (reporting redemption rate of 26.3
percent).
32. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, A Damage-Revelation Model of Coupon
Remedies, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 653, 653 (2007). Polinsky and Rubinfeld summarize the
literature critical of coupon settlements, but argue that coupons may be socially efficient if they
are designed as an alternative to cash and make the defendant bear costs that better reflect the
harms they have caused. This may be a strong deterrence argument, but it does little for the
compensation goal.
33. Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
34. See Edward Cavanagh, Antitrust Remedies Revisited, 84 OR. L. REV. 147, 214 (2005).
35. Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An
Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 879 (2008).
36. Id. at 880.
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calculations are performed.37 Of the total recovery, "$12.088 to $13.438
billion, in thirty-two cases, was recovered by direct purchasers; $1.815
billion, in six cases, was recovered by indirect purchasers; and $4.028
to $4.311 billion, in six cases, was recovered by competitors."38 Since
direct purchasers often pass along a substantial portion of any
overcharge downstream, 39 over two-thirds of the recoveries studied
likely failed to compensate the parties who ultimately absorbed most
of the economic injury.
The downstream channeling of costs is primarily a feature of
U.S. standing rules, so one should also consider the $1.815 billion
recovered in the six indirect purchaser cases to gauge whether these
recoveries help to offset the phenomenon. 40 While this results in an
average recovery of about $300 million per case, the numbers are
skewed by the El Paso litigation, which resulted in a $1.4 billion
recovery for the indirect purchasers. Eliminating this outlier results in
an average indirect purchaser recovery of $77.6 million. In each case,
the settlement pot was further reduced by an attorney's fee award,
generally in the 20 to 33 percent range.41
It is unclear how much the disbursement of the remaining
settlement amount benefited the downstream consumers. For
example, take the Augmentin case, which is one of the six indirect
purchaser recoveries in the study.42 In Augmentin, the indirect
purchaser settlement value was $29 million. Class counsel recovered
25 percent as attorneys' fees, leaving $21.75 million to be distributed
to the indirect purchasers. 43 However, the indirect purchaser class
consisted of both insurers and state governments in addition to
consumers. 44 The insurers, perhaps not having standing as direct
purchasers and hence counting as indirect purchasers, likely passed
along most of the overcharge to their insured, many or most of whom
were not part of the recovering class. What was the outcome for the
injured consumers themselves-those who took the anti-depressant
drug Remeron? They were awarded only 32.8 percent of the settlement
37. Id. at 891.
38. Id. at 899.
39. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
40. Some states permit indirect purchaser suits under their own antitrust laws. See supra
text accompanying notes 28-29.
41. Lande & Davis, supra note 35, at 911-12, tbls.7a-c.
42. Id. at 879.
43. Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Antitrust Private Antitrust
Enforcement: Forty Individual Case Studies 19 (Am. Antitrust Inst., 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105523 (providing further detail on the Augmenin case).
44. In re Remeron End-Payor Antitrust Litig., Nos. Civ. 02-2007 FSH, Civ. 04-5126 FSH,
2005 WL 2230314, at *1, *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 13, 2005).
Vol. 63:3:675684
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fund, or $7.134 million after attorneys' fees.45 The settlement opinion
does not reveal their precise number, but it does state that over
800,000 notices were sent to potential class members.4 6 Given these
numbers, it is unlikely that the settlement yielded more than a few
dollars per injured class member.
There is another way of looking at the compensation in such
cases. The Augmentin settlement opinion reveals that out of the
800,000 consumers to whom notice was given, only 65,000 filed proofs
of claim.47 Assuming that all 65,000 claims were allowed, each
member received an average of about $109 from the settlement, which
may not be an insignificant sum to many families. Should this modest
compensation to about 8 percent of the injured parties count as a
success? Perhaps those who filed proofs of claim were the members
who felt most aggrieved by the violation, and hence were most in need
of compensation. Still, it is more likely that they were the members
with the time and education to file proofs of claim. By contrast, the
remaining 92 percent simply absorbed their losses.
The outlier El Paso case, which resulted in a recovery of $1.4
billion for indirect purchasers, involved claims that natural gas
suppliers artificially inflated the price of natural gas in California.48
The indirect purchasers consisted of 13 million California consumers
and 3,000 businesses.49 Naturally, the possibility of cutting a check to
the prevailing plaintiffs was unsatisfactory because of the substantial
administrative costs in "maintain[ing] mailing addresses and
print[ing] checks."50 Instead, the settlement provided for a complex
scheme of remittances to the California Public Utilities Commission
and for natural gas rate reductions over fifteen to twenty years.51
Because natural gas is rate regulated in California, 52 the settlement
amounted to an agreement about rate-regulation principles for the
next two decades.
One may describe the El Paso scheme as compensating
consumers as a class, but such a description would be largely
inaccurate. This is because consumer injuries occurring in the past
correspond only roughly to future consumer gains. Injured consumers
45. Id. at *25.
46. Id. at *19.
47. Id.
48. Lande & Davis, supra note 43, at 77.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 84.
51. Id. at 84-86.
52. California Public Utilities Commission, Natural Gas and California, http://www.cpuc.
ca.gov/puc/Energy/gas/natgasandca.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).
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who died, moved away from California, or discontinued natural gas
service over the rate-reduction period received no compensation, or
they received compensation that bore little relation to the amount of
their injury. On the other hand, consumers who moved to California or
otherwise began natural gas consumption after the violation received
a windfall. In sum, consumers whose consumption patterns or volume
changed significantly from the time of the violation to the rate-
reduction period were either overcompensated or undercompensated.
The El Paso settlement did not amount to a serious effort to identify
persons who suffered economic harm and compensate them in
proportion to their loss.
As the above examples illustrate, identifying, locating, and
compensating the real economic victims of an antitrust overcharge is
often impossible. Compensation, therefore, is a noble but ultimately
unrealistic goal.
There exists one class of interests to which the forgoing
observations do not apply with equal force. When competitors are
injured by an exclusionary practice, they are not overcharged. Instead,
they lose profits. In a small sense, the ripple-effects principle of
economic injury still applies to competing firms. For example, a
manufacturer plaintiff that loses sales because of an antitrust
violation may mitigate its losses by laying off employees, borrowing
less money from banks, or demanding fewer raw materials from
suppliers. However, the adversely affected employees, banks, and
suppliers do not have standing to sue because their injury is too
remote from the violation.53 Still, the competitor plaintiff usually will
have experienced the majority of the economic injury; in this sense,
the competitor is situated like an ordinary tort victim. Further, it is
not hard in most cases to identify competitors that have lost profits,
even if the precise amount of their injury is difficult to determine. 54
Because their injury is concentrated, it is generally cost-effective to
award them damages.
There are several problems with justifying a compensation-
oriented private remedy on the grounds that competitors are good
candidates for compensation. First, there is a widespread and
probably legitimate concern that competitor plaintiffs frequently use
antitrust law for anticompetitive purposes.55 If anything, private
53. See generally Associated Gen. Contractors v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
54. See generally Roger D. Blair & William H. Page, "Speculative" Antitrust Damages, 70
WASH. L. REV. 423 (1995) (suggesting methods of proving non-speculative damages).
55. See William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition,
28 J.L. & EcoN. 247 (1985); Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 5-32 (2005); Frank H. Easterbook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984); R.
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competitor lawsuits make it harder for consumers to receive full
compensation, since courts often react to competitor lawsuits by
crafting liability norms in a way that stymies consumer suits as well.56
Second, competitor harm-or at least the kind of harm
recognized by antitrust law-does not occur in many antitrust cases. If
a cartel raises prices, a firm that does not join the cartel nonetheless
benefits from it.67 If an anticompetitive merger harms a rival firm
because in the but-for world it would have faced less competition, the
rival firm has not suffered antitrust injury and may not recover
damages.58 On the other hand, it is also possible that antitrust
violations harm competitors without harming consumers, as is true in
cases of attempted monopolization where a dominant firm harms its
rival but fails to obtain monopoly power.59 But in those cases, the
ordinary justification for allowing the competitor suit is a prophylactic
one-namely, that it is better to prevent antitrust violations before
they occur.60 This is not a compensation justification; rather, it is a
deterrence argument in which the rival's lawsuit is merely a means to
achieve the end of consumer welfare.
Relatedly, any harm suffered by an excluded competitor is
incidental to the economic purposes of antitrust law. The Supreme
Court has often declared that "[t]he purpose of the antitrust laws . . .
is 'the protection of competition, not competitors.' "61 Therefore,
individual competitors serve as means to the end of consumer welfare.
While antitrust may do a comparatively better job of compensating
them than other classes of victims, this is not the major purpose of
antitrust law.
Preston McAfee & Nicholas V. Vakkur, The Strategic Abuse of the Antitrust Laws, 2 J.
STRATEGIC MGMT. EDUC. 37, 37-38 (2005); Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of
the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REV. 551 (1991).
56. See Crane, supra note 2, at 40-43.
57. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
58. See generally Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
59. See generally Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
60. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
61. Leegin Creative Leather Pros., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 906 (2007) (citing Atl.
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338 (1990)). Whether the "competition, not
competitors" maxim applies with equal force in the European Union has been the subject of
much discussion. See Damien Gerardin, The Perils of Antitrust Proliferation: The Globalization
of Antitrust and the Risks of Overregulation of Competitive Behavior, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 189, 207
(2009). Nonetheless, the European Commission seems to have come around to a consumer
welfare orientation. DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 to
Exclusionary Abuses 4, Dec. 2005, available at http://ec.europa.eulcompetition/antitrust
/art82/discpaper2005.pdf. It would thus be anomalous even in the European Union to justify the
expense, burden, and systemic effects of private antitrust litigation if all it did was compensate
aggrieved competitors.
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2. Dynamic Injuries
Economists and antitrust scholars increasingly view static
consumer injuries as far less significant than dynamic injuries. 62 The
major dispute concerning competition policy and innovation is not
whether innovation creates more consumer welfare than static
efficiency, but whether antitrust enforcement can meaningfully
advance dynamic efficiency. For those who follow the tradition of
Joseph Schumpeter, all significant competition is dynamic and static
efficiency is of dubious importance.63 Because the path of innovation is
unpredictable, some economists in the Schumpeterian tradition doubt
whether antitrust law does much to advance consumer welfare. 64 On
the other side, those who follow the tradition of Kenneth Arrow
contend that antitrust law is critical to fostering consumer welfare,
since oligopolistic markets tend to foster lower rates of innovation
than more competitive markets.65 Still, whether one follows
Schumpeter or Arrow, there is general agreement that innovation and
technological progress are vital to the advancement of consumer
welfare, and that they are probably far more significant than short-
term pricing and output effects.66
Private antitrust litigation is no better at compensating
consumers for dynamic injuries than for static injuries. Indeed, it is
probably worse. With respect to static injuries, it is possible for
economists to estimate the amount of the overcharge, though the
estimate may sometimes be speculative and does not address
62. See Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 253 (stating that "today no one doubts [Robert M.
Solow's] basic conclusion that innovation and technological progress very likely contribute much
more to economic growth than policy pressures that drive investment and output toward the
competitive level"); Michael E. Porter, Competition and Antitrust: A Productivity-Based
Approach, in UNIQUE VALUE: COMPETITION BASED ON INNOVATION: CREATING UNIQUE VALUE
FOR ANTITRUST, THE ECONOMY, EDUCATION AND BEYOND 154, 156-57 (Charles D. Weller ed.,
2004).
63. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 84-85 (1942).
64. See Harold Demsetz, How Many Cheers for Antitrust's 100 Years?, 30 ECON INQUIRY 207
(1992); Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 3
(2007) ("In the light of the potential tension between competition and innovation, and in the light
of the uncertainty that innovation creates for predictions about competitive effects of mergers
and future conditions in relevant markets, a growing body of commentary has questioned the
relationship of antitrust law to innovation.").
65. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 619-22
(Richard Nelson ed., 1962). See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How
Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575 (2007).
66. See, e.g., Thomas 0. Barnett, Maximizing Welfare Through Technological Innovation, 15
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1191, 1194 2008) (arguing that "dynamic efficiency-particularly leapfrog
dynamic efficiency-accounts for the lion's share of efficiency/welfare gains").
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deadweight static losses.67 In contrast, measuring the amount of
dynamic efficiency loss and quantifying this loss in dollars often
amounts to little more than guesswork.68 Dynamic efficiency losses
suffer from an incommensurability problem, and commensurability is
usually considered the very heart of legal compensation models.69
For example, suppose that Microsoft undertakes a campaign to
quash the development of a multi-platform Java programming system
in order to prevent Java from developing a program that could
compete with Microsoft's Windows operating system. 70 As a result,
Microsoft retains its operating system dominance and overcharges
consumers for Windows. The overcharge portion of the static harm,
although not the deadweight loss, can be quantified and reduced to a
damages award in litigation. But the much larger harm may be the
loss of an unknown amount and variety of technological innovations
that would have followed had Microsoft not stymied Java
programmers in creating a competitive alternative.71 Since operating
systems function as a platform to other applications, technological
innovations in the operating systems field could have led to countless
innovations in applications.
Unsurprisingly, very few antitrust plaintiffs seek compensation
for dynamic injuries. Even when they do seek such compensation,
courts are inhospitable to their claims. Proving the but-for world of
competitive innovation is far too speculative an endeavor to meet the
evidentiary burden required by civil litigation. Thus, courts have
rejected claims against Microsoft for stifled innovation. 72
For example, the Fourth Circuit held that "[i]t would be
entirely speculative and beyond the competence of a judicial
proceeding to create in hindsight a technological universe that never
came into existence. . . . It would be even more speculative to
determine the relevant benefits and detriments that non-Microsoft
products would have brought to the market and the relative monetary
value . . . to a diffuse population of end users."7 3 As the Fourth Circuit
observed, the problems of proof were not limited to the specific facts of
67. See supra text accompanying note 54.
68. Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 257.
69. But see Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DuKE L.J. 56,
57 (1993) (arguing for an alternative view of compensation form of redress based on "affirming
public respect for the existence of rights and public recognition of the transgressor's fault with
regard to disrespecting rights").
70. See Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 257-59.
71. Id. at 257.
72. Id. at 258-59.
73. Moth v. Microsoft, 444 F.3d 312, 324 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Microsoft, 127 F.
Supp. 2d 702, 711 (2001)).
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the Microsoft case: "At bottom, the harms that the plaintiffs have
alleged with respect to the loss of competitive technologies are so
diffuse that they could not possibly be adequately measured. The
problem is not one of discovery and specific evidence, but of the nature
of the injury claimed."74
Damages for these sorts of harms are almost never recovered in
private litigation. Again, one might posit that the treble damages
remedy is a rough proxy for compensating plaintiffs for some
unquantifiable dynamic injury,75 but such an argument is weak. The
installed base of consumers who continued to purchase the defendant's
products after the monopolistic price increase are often the very
consumers who would have continued to purchase from the defendant
even if an innovative, competitive product had entered the market.
The consumers most likely to have purchased the hypothetical
innovative product are the ones who stopped purchasing from the
defendant and substituted to less desirable second choices after a price
increase, or who never began purchasing from the defendant in the
first place.76 Awarding treble damages to the consumers who paid the
overcharges does not compensate the consumers who likely suffered
most of the dynamic injuries.
Just because private antitrust litigation does not compensate
consumers for the harms of stifled innovation does not mean that
private litigation is not useful in deterring conduct that stifles
innovation. In the same way that private litigation may prevent static
deadweight losses by deterring antitrust violations, so too may it
prevent conduct that stymies innovation. What private antitrust
litigation cannot do in most cases is recover damages for forgone
technological development or purchases. Since most scholars would
agree that these injuries are by far the most troubling ones, antitrust
damages thus seem incapable of achieving compensation for the most
significant antitrust injuries.
B. Deterrence
Those who believe that antitrust law exists primarily to
promote economic efficiency argue that deterrence, and not
compensation, should be the primary purpose of private antitrust
74. Id.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
76. For example, in the case of Microsoft the most likely victims of the suppression of
innovation are users of Linux or other operating systems who would have seen the development
of a more innovative operating system market in the but-for world.
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enforcement."7 In their view, antitrust damages supplement criminal
fines by removing any expected profitability from antitrust
violations.78 Decisionmakers in dominant firms will perceive that they
are better off by not violating antitrust law, given the likelihood of
detection multiplied by the penalty. Unlike other fields of law in which
the deterrent value of private enforcement has been questioned, 79 the
deterrent success of private antitrust enforcement is largely taken for
granted.80
In order to evaluate this deterrence claim, one must ascertain
who is being deterred. The primary class of relevant decisionmakers is
corporate managers, although one must also consider the possibility
that vigilant shareholders will rein in managers who fail to respond to
antitrust incentives. With respect to these managers, the argument
that private antitrust litigation provides effective deterrence is
increasingly undermined. Two converging trends-the increasing
length of antitrust proceedings and the increasing shortness of
managerial tenure-make it likely that corporate managers severely
discount the threat of future litigation damages.
First, the time gap between the planning of antitrust violation
(which is presumably the moment at which deterrence should take
root) and antitrust judgment day is growing longer. While current
statistics on the duration of antitrust litigation are not readily
available, it is possible to make reasonable assumptions based on the
available data. For the last decade, the average disposition time for all
civil cases in the federal system has been steady at between eight and
nine months. The average time from filing of the case to trial has
steadily increased from around 18.5 months in 199681 to 24.6 months
77. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 17, at 266 (arguing that compensation should be a
"subsidiary" goal to deterrence); Page, supra note 10, at 1451 (arguing that "the deterrent
function must predominate").
78. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169 (1968). As Bill Landes has explained, "[t]he optimal penalty should equal the net
harm to persons other than the offender, adjusted upward if the probability of apprehension and
conviction is less than one." William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 652, 678 (1983).
79. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on
Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1535-36 (2006) ("As presently
constituted, securities class actions produce wealth transfers among shareholders that neither
compensate nor deter.").
80. Some commentators have questioned whether treble damages are adequate to achieve
optimal deterrence. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Five Myths About Antitrust Damages, 40 U.S.F. L.
REV. 651 (2006). However, most commentators seem to assume, without discussion, that the
prospect of antitrust damages is successfully conveyed to the firm, even if the exact size of the
multiplier should be higher.
81. See FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS (2001), available at http://www.uscourts
.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2001.pl.
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in 2007.82 This suggests that early disposition of cases, whether due to
motions to dismiss or early settlement practice, has declined
somewhat but that cases going all the way to trial take much longer
than before because of the increasing complexity of modern litigation
and the increasing burden of discovery.83 The Georgetown study of
private antitrust litigation conducted in the early 1980s found that
antitrust cases take, on average, about three times longer than other
federal cases from initiation of the lawsuit to disposition.84 While this
ratio has likely not remained constant-the average private antitrust
lawsuit today takes over six years to disposition-the average
antitrust suit almost certainly lasts several years. In 2007, there were
378 federal antitrust cases that had been pending for over three years,
an immense number considering that there were only a thousand new
antitrust filings and that many cases are quickly disposed of on
motions to dismiss.85
The time from filing to trial tells only part of the story. The
average interval from the filing of a notice of appeal to final
disposition is now over a year for all federal cases. 86 The average
interval for antitrust cases is likely even longer due to their monetary
significance and complexity. Certiorari petitions to the Supreme Court
typically add another year to the delay, during which the appellate
court's mandate and the corresponding obligation to pay the judgment
are stayed.87 Moreover, the misconduct at issue usually begins at least
a year or two-and often many years-before the complaint is even
filed. Hence, in the average private antitrust case, the time from the
82. See FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS (2007), available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2007.pl.
83. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) 2006 advisory committee's note (describing increased
burdens from electronic discovery).
84. The Georgetown study found that the average time for the termination of all cases was
24.9 months, with a median of 16.6 months. See Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic
Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1009 (1986). For comparative
purposes, the median length of federal civil cases at the time of the Georgetown study was about
nine months. Id.
85. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS
tbls.S-11 & C-2 (2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/contents.html. To put
the antitrust numbers in perspective, it may be useful to consider the ratio between three-year
old cases and new filings for other classes of private lawsuits. The following are some other
categories of cases by (1) new filings, (2) three-year old cases, and (3) ratio between (1) and (2):
breach of contract: 33,939; 1,358, 25:1; civil rights: 31,756, 2,077, 15:1; environmental: 767, 214,
4:1; labor: 18,674, 532, 35:1; RICO: 653, 122, 5:1. Antitrust, with fewer than three new filings per
three-year-old case shows a significantly greater disposition toward lengthy cases than other
common categories of business litigation.
86. Id. at tbl.B-4.
87. FED. R. APP. P. 41(d)(2).
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beginning of an anticompetitive scheme until judgment day is at least
five years and may be closer to ten years or more.
The relevant time intervals in two recent private antitrust
cases, in which the plaintiffs won substantial damages awards at trial
and had them affirmed on appeal, are instructive. In LePage's Inc. v.
3M, the allegedly anticompetitive bundled rebates were put in place in
1992; LePage's filed suit in 1997 but did not prevail until 2004, when
the Supreme Court denied certiorari.88 In Conwood Co. v. U.S.
Tobacco Co., the plan to eliminate Conwood was hatched in 1990,
Conwood sued in 1998, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
2003.89 In both cases, the time between the decision to engage in the
challenged conduct and the end of the legal process was well over a
decade.
This time lag should be paired with the fact that the managers
who put into place anticompetitive schemes are increasingly unlikely
to be around to internalize their effects at judgment day. During the
1980s, the turnover rate among senior managers in large corporations
was just above ten percent. 90 By all accounts, the turnover rate
increased significantly-perhaps even doubling-in the 1990s and
2000s as various capital market factors accentuated shareholder
demand for short-term performance. 91 Today, the average CEO holds
her job for about six years. 92 Mid-level executives, such as divisional
managers, typically hold their jobs for an even shorter period, perhaps
less than four years. 93 Thus, most of the executives responsible for an
88. LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 144 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 953 (2004).
89. Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 772, 775 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1148 (2003).
90. See Anne T. Coughlan & Ronald M. Schmidt, Executive Compensation, Management
Turnover, and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 43, 52 tbl.1
(1985) (documenting an average CEO turnover of 12.7 percent for all firms listed in Forbes
compensation survey from 1978-1980); Jerold B. Warner, Ross L. Watts & Karen H. Wruck,
Stock Prices and Top Management Changes, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 461, 461 tbl.1 (1988) (calculating
average annualized rate of 11.5 percent for arrivals or departures by top management including
CEO, chairman, or president positions based on Wall Street Journal reports from 1963-1978).
91. Kathleen A. Farrell & David A. Whidbee, Impact of Firm Performance Expectations on
CEO Turnover and Replacement Decisions, 36 J. AccT. & ECON. 165, 173 tbl.1 (2003) (recording a
9 percent turnover rate from 1986-1997); Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has
CEO Turnover Changed? Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy
CEOs 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12465, 2006) (reporting that in the
period 1998-2005, CEO turnover increased to 16.5 percent, implying an average CEO tenure of
just over six years).
92. Kaplan & Minton, supra note 91, at 2.
93. R.M. Bushman, R.J. Indjejikian & A. Smith, Compensation Contracts in Hierarchical
Organizations: Determinants of Incentive Pay for Business Unit Managers (Univ. of Chi. Working
Paper, 1994) (reporting 3.7 year average tenure for division managers).
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antitrust violation will no longer be with the firm by the time a
damages award is entered against the company.
High managerial turnover rates might not thwart the
deterrence objective if managers were to internalize some of the
detrimental effects of antitrust judgments rendered after they leave
the defendant firm. In particular, managers might incur a
reputational cost in lost future employment opportunities or take a
prestige hit in the business community by virtue of their past roles in
a later-adjudicated antitrust violation.94 But there is scant evidence
suggesting that individual managers' reputations are much affected
by antitrust judgments against their former employers. Individual
managers are not often named as co-defendants in private antitrust
cases and usually do not appear in any public pronouncement of
liability. Liability in complex antitrust cases seldom turns on the
culpability of a single manager, but rather on a cluster of managerial
decisions over time, making it difficult to pinpoint blame.95 Relatedly,
judicial opinions in private antitrust cases often omit the names of
individual managers, instead referring to the acts of an impersonal
corporation or "the defendant." For example, in the much-publicized
LePage's Inc. v. 3M case, neither the district court nor the Third
Circuit opinion referred to a single 3M executive by name.96 In most
cases, an outsider to the litigation would find it difficult to impose a
reputational sanction against any present or former firm manager.
In light of these facts, it is difficult to see how the threat of a
future damages judgment disciplines managerial decisionmaking.
When managers plan conduct that brings immediate large profits but
only potential liability at some future date, the extent to which the
future liability deters them from choosing immediate profits is a
function of their implicit discount rate for the potential damages
award. The longer the perceived time until judgment day, the more
likely it is that managers will discount the threat of damages. If
managers believe that they are unlikely to be employed by the firm at
the distant judgment day, they will tend to disregard the threat of
future liability altogether.
Yet the story is not so simple. One must consider the possibility
that private antitrust litigation forces managers and shareholders to
94. See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability, 31 J.
CORP. L. 453, 459-60 (2006).
95. Things may be different in price-fixing cases, where a single rogue manager may collude
with someone outside the firm. For other reasons discussed below, private damages actions have
a more plausible deterrent effect when they are follow-ons to criminal prosecutions. See infra
text accompanying note 106.
96. LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003).
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internalize the costs of an antitrust violation long before any judgment
day. Efficient capital markets may punish the firm and, by extension,
its managers as soon as a lawsuit is threatened or filed. According to
one study, the filing of a securities class action lawsuit by investors
more than doubled the likelihood of CEO turnover.97
It is unlikely, however, that the mere filing of a private
antitrust suit brings about severe consequences for a defendant firm's
managers. Unlike securities lawsuits, which may impair shareholder
confidence in the integrity of insiders, antitrust lawsuits may instead
communicate that company managers are acting aggressively to
expand market share and increase profitability. This is especially true
in the case of private antitrust lawsuits, which many shareholders
may rightly regard as signaling that rival firms are merely disaffected
by aggressive, but ultimately lawful, competition. While empirical
work suggests that the filing of an antitrust action by the Department
of Justice or Federal Trade Commission has an immediate and
significant negative effect on a defendant firm's share price, the filing
of a private antitrust lawsuit has only about a tenth of the effect of a
public suit. Empirical studies have found that defendants lost, on
average, 6 percent of their share value upon the filing of a government
antitrust lawsuit,98 but only about 0.6 percent of their share value
upon the filing of a private lawsuit.99 A half-percent drop in market
capitalization is unlikely to engender ruinous consequences to most
managers, particularly if the gains from the challenged behavior were
large.
There are two other ways that private antitrust lawsuits might
mete out negative sanctions on corporate managers prior to judgment
day. First, antitrust litigation is extremely expensive and the costs are
often borne disproportionately by defendants. 100 CEOs, CFOs, and
particularly general counsels care a great deal about legal fees, but
the divisional managers who often make the decisions that ensnare a
97. See Philip E. Strahan, Securities Class Actions, Corporate Governance and Managerial
Agency Problems 22 (June 1998), available at http:// papers.ssrn.com/abstract=104356 (reporting
that filing of a securities class action lawsuit by investors increased probability of CEO turnover
from 9.8 percent to 23.4 percent).
98. Kenneth D. Garbade et al., Market Reaction to the Filing of Antitrust Suits: An
Aggregate and Cross-Sectional Analysis, 64 REV. ECON. & STAT. 686, 686-71 (1982).
99. John M. Bizjak & Jeffrey L. Coles, The Effect of Private Antitrust Litigation on the
Stock-Market Valuation of the Firm, 85 J. AM. EcoN. REV. 436, 437 (1995). The average share
loss upon the filing of a private lawsuit is about $4 million.
100. See Crane, supra note 55, at 13 (defendants may presume that an antitrust lawsuit will
be more expensive than a potential entrant); Frank H. Easterbook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63
TEX. L. REV. 1, 34 (1984) (the asymmetrical structure of incentives in antitrust litigation imposes
greater costs on defendants).
2010] 695
HeinOnline  -- 63 Vand. L. Rev. 695 2010
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
firm in an antitrust suit may not care. A divisional manager typically
seeks to maximize the reported profitability of her own business unit,
not necessarily the value of her firm as a whole.' 0' For accounting
purposes, legal fees are often treated as operating expenses of the firm
as a whole. Therefore, legal fees may not come directly out of a
divisional manager's budget or count against her revenues for the
purposes of divisional financial reporting and incentive compensation.
The threat of having to pay legal fees during a protracted and
expensive lawsuit may have relatively little deterrent effect on the key
decisionmakers who consider whether to engage in anticompetitive
tactics.
A second way that private antitrust lawsuits could provide an
early deterrent shock is through large settlement payouts, which are a
sort of privately negotiated and accelerated judgment day. But with
the exception of government case tag-along suits, which are discussed
below, large settlement payouts in private cases usually do not occur
until the eve of trial. Corporate managers and boards are usually
unwilling to open up their coffers for more than nuisance value
settlements until the threat of an adverse judgment is imminent.
Thus, private settlements may accelerate judgment day by short-
circuiting appeals, but the average time from the planning of
anticompetitive conduct to the payment of any substantial settlement
amount still probably exceeds five years.
If managers cannot be expected to respond reliably to the
threat of distant and unpredictable liability judgments against their
firms, how about shareholders? Two related factors suggest that
shareholders do not have strong incentives or capabilities either. First,
the kind of industrial behavior that gives rise to antitrust claims
creates the prospect of substantial long-run costs if an antitrust
challenge is successful, but offers significant short-run profits in the
meantime. From an outsider's perspective, it is very hard to evaluate
the risk that firm behavior will produce eventual antitrust liability.
Whether conduct of the kind adjudged under antitrust's rule of reason
and monopolization law's amorphous. standards is likely to result in
antitrust liability is difficult for antitrust experts to predict, let alone
101. See Philip G. Berger & Eli Ofek, Diversification's Effect on Firm Value, 37 J. FIN. ECON.
39, 40 (1995) (discussing "misalignment between central and divisional managers"); Flora Guidry
et al., Earnings-Based Bonus Plans and Earnings Management by Business Unit Managers, 26 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 113, 139-40 (1999) (divisional managers seek to maximize short-term
profitability of business units rather than that of international conglomerate); Hyun-Han Shin &
Ren6 Stulz, Are Internal Capital Markets Efficient, 113 Q.J. ECoN. 531, 533 (1998) (divisional
managers can create deadweight costs through rent-seeking and internal politics).
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the average institutional investor.102 It is unlikely that many
shareholders will try to curb behavior that increases a firm's market
share and profits but that might eventually lead to antitrust liability.
Even assuming that a large institutional investor with access to
corporate insiders were aware that conduct was risky from an
antitrust perspective, it still often would be a rational strategy to
approve tacitly the risky conduct, hold the stock for a few years while
its value increases, and then sell before an antitrust suit commences.
The initial filing of the private lawsuit does relatively little damage to
the issuer's share price, so savvy shareholders will have plenty of time
to reap their profits and then exit.
Given all of the above factors, it is implausible that the threat
of future private litigation does much to deter anticompetitive
behavior. The author's own experience in a private antitrust case is
illustrative. By the time the case settled during an appeal, it had been
nine years since the lawsuit was filed and fifteen years since the
alleged misconduct began. Only a handful of personnel who were with
the company during the relevant events were still employed by the
firm at the time of settlement. Since the underlying conduct occurred,
the company had witnessed multiple generations of senior
management come and go. The company's capital structure had
changed multiple times, too. First, it was part of a corporate
conglomerate, then it was spun off as an independent, publicly traded
company, then it was acquired by another conglomerate, and shortly
afterwards it was taken private. The managers and shareholders who
had reaped the gains from any unlawful conduct-assuming that
there was any-had long since moved on.
Of course, deterrence is not just about deterring the individual
managers who undertook the wrongful acts from doing so again.
Deterrence also seeks to set an example that others will heed.103 But
others will learn the lesson that is actually taught to the wrongdoers,
and not the abstract lesson that antitrust law is trying to teach. If a
manager at General Electric observes a successful private antitrust
lawsuit against 3M and is asked what it means for him, his answer
may well be: "It is perfectly rational for me to beat up on my rival if
that increases the success of my division, my incentive compensation,
102. See generally Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49 (2007) (antitrust is moving away from ex ante rules toward ex post
multifactor standards, shifting judgments from judges to fact-finders and administrative
agencies).
103. See Michael K. Block & Jonathan S. Feinstein, The Spillover Effect of Antitrust
Enforcement, 68 REV. ECON. & STAT. 122, 122 (1986) (observing that antitrust deterrence is most
effective when targeted at other firms in the same industry as the violator).
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and the value of my stock options. By the time judgment day arrives, I
will probably be in a job two times removed from this one and have
diversified my stock portfolio so that General Electric's stock will
account for a relatively small proportion of my wealth."
In theory, there is some cause to be optimistic about the
deterrence potential of private lawsuits in cases brought as follow-ons
to government criminal prosecutions against cartels. 104 The Justice
Department's leniency program, which provides substantial incentives
for early defection from cartels, leads many firms to enter guilty pleas
as soon as a price-fixing conspiracy is detected. 05 Once a firm has
entered a guilty plea, it will often pay out large private settlements
quickly because its defenses are very limited.106 Therefore, follow-on
private damages actions in cartel cases provide a much swifter
predicted judgment day than do other classes of private antitrust
litigation. Although private follow-on suits have the potential to
provide substantial deterrence "kickers," a federal statute encourages
firms to participate in the leniency program by limiting follow-on suits
against defendants granted leniency to single damages.107 The statute
cuts by two-thirds the deterrence-effectiveness of many follow-on
private suits and essentially orients such suits toward a compensation
goal. In sum, effective private litigation deterrence is rare.
C. Compensation vs. Deterrence in Emerging Jurisdictions
Most foreign jurisdictions that have, or are in the process of
implementing, private antitrust litigation justify it based on
deterrence, compensation, or both. 08 To the extent they struggle over
the proper goals of private enforcement, the question is generally
whether compensation or deterrence will take precedence. In the
European Union, the tentative answer is that compensation should be
the primary objective and deterrence should be secondary.109
104. The government does not criminally prosecute any antitrust offenses except for hard-
core cartel behavior. Kathryn K. Dyer & Garrett M. Liskey, Antitrust Violations, 45 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 195, 223-24 (2008) (discussing aggressive prosecution of international cartels).
105. See Donald C. Klawiter, Corporate Leniency in the Age of International Cartels: The
American Experience, 14 ANTITRUST 13 (2000).
106. The firm is collaterally estopped to deny that it engaged in price-fixing. 15 U.S.C. §
16(a) (2006). It can still contest the standing of the class of purchasers and the amount of their
damages.
107. Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237,
§ 213(a), 118 Stat. 666 (2004) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and accompanying
notes).
108. See EU White Paper, supra note 4, at 3.
109. Id.
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For all of the reasons identified in this Article, compensation is
a poor choice. The case for deterrence is weak, but perhaps more
attainable given a speedier adjudicatory system or systemic
refinements forcing managers to internalize the costs usually borne
only by shareholders. On the other hand, whatever the theoretical
desirability of compensating injured victims of antitrust violations, the
case that private litigation accomplishes effective compensation is
very weak. It is unlikely that procedural adjustments would fix the
problem, since it is difficult to imagine any effective way of securing
compensation for the downstream purchasers. 1 0
Indeed, compensation is even more likely to fail as a goal in the
European Union, its member states, and jurisdictions with similar
legal regimes than it is in the United States. The choice of
compensation as an objective often interacts with procedural and
administrative rules that render private antitrust litigation ineffective
at achieving any rational goal. Consider the progression of the
argument in the European Commission's White Paper. It begins by
announcing that compensation should be the primary goal of private
antitrust enforcement in the European Union. 1 ' This announcement
frames the procedural discussions that follow. First, because
compensation is the goal, the real economic victim of the violation
should always have standing to sue. Accordingly, indirect purchasers
all the way down the distribution chain should have standing.112
Indeed, the White Paper proposes a rebuttable presumption that end
purchasers absorb the entire overcharge.113 Conversely, since other
parties in the distribution chain who pass the overcharge downstream
do not suffer real economic injury, the antitrust violator should be
allowed to assert a pass-on defense to the distributors' claims.114
The Commission's proposed standard is already the rule in a
number of jurisdictions with emerging private antitrust enforcement.
According to a 2007 study of a number of jurisdictions by the
International Competition Network ("ICN"), most would probably
invoke unjust enrichment principles to deny recovery to a wholesaler
or retailer who simply passes on the overcharge, despite the fact that
the vast majority of the jurisdictions surveyed had not explicitly
considered either the direct purchaser rule or the pass-on defense.115
110. See Posner, supra note 30, at 1590.
111. EU White Paper, supra note 4, at 3.
112. Id. at 4.
113. Id. at 8.
114. Id.
115. International Competition Network Annual Conference, Moscow (May 2007), Report of
the Cartels Working Group, Interaction of Public and Private Enforcement in Cartel Case, at 12.
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Conversely, the ICN study concluded that the vast majority of
surveyed jurisdictions would probably allow suits by indirect
purchasers.116 To the extent that jurisdictions favor a compensation
goal, they will presumably opt for indirect purchaser standing and the
availability of a pass-on defense.
The effects of a compensation objective do not end with
standing principles. The White Paper calls for "full compensation of
the real value of the loss suffered."117 The White Paper goes on to
make clear that this includes not only "actual loss" but also lost profits
and interest." While this all sounds generous to plaintiffs, there is a
highly significant subtext: treble damages or other damages
multipliers are inconsistent with a compensatory regime, since they
award plaintiffs a windfall far in excess of their actual damages.
Two more procedural aspects of compensation-oriented regimes
are significant. First, class action procedures are rare in continental
systems.119 The White Paper recognizes that the parties bearing the
economic burden of antitrust violations have often "suffered scattered
and relatively low-value damages" and that some form of claim
aggregation is therefore necessary for private enforcement. 120 Still, the
White Paper shies away from U.S.-style class actions, calling instead
for "representative actions" by "qualified entities," such as state bodies
or trade associations, or "opt-in collective actions." 121 The ICN reports
that class actions are available in only five of the jurisdictions it
surveyed.122
Another procedural issue raised by the White Paper and
commonly discussed in jurisdictions considering private antitrust
enforcement is discovery. Here, again, the White Paper rejects the
U.S. model. Although the White Paper recognizes the need for some
information disclosure in litigation, it seems far more concerned about
"the negative effects of overly broad and burdensome disclosure
obligations, including the risk of abuses."123 It proposes that any
discovery should be court-ordered (rather than party-initiated, as in
116. Id.
117. EU White Paper, supra note 4, at 7.
118. Id.
119. See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the Future of
American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2009) (discussing European alternatives to
U.S.-style class actions and concluding that "U.S.-style class actions are likely to remain
exceptional from a trans-Atlantic perspective").
120. EU White Paper, supra note 4, at 4.
121. Id.
122. International Competition Network Annual Conference, supra note 115, at 4.
123. EU White Paper, supra note 4, at 5.
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the United States) and only available when the plaintiff has pleaded
facts plausibly showing the existence of an antitrust violation; 12 4
satisfied the court that he cannot reasonably obtain the facts except
through discovery; specified the precise categories of information to be
disclosed; and demonstrated that the discovery requests are relevant,
necessary, and proportionate. 12 5
In sum, the proposed EU system, which is also characteristic of
other emerging antitrust jurisdictions, promotes compensation as its
primary objective and, consequently, provides for indirect purchaser
standing, single damages, and restrictive rules on claim aggregation
and discovery. By contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court has nominally
recognized deterrence and compensation as coequal objectives, but has
seemed to favor deterrence over compensation when the two interests
diverged.126 As previously noted, the United States generally follows a
direct purchaser rule, in which the direct purchasers of the overpriced
goods have standing to sue even though they may pass on the
overcharge by reselling the good at a marked-up price and thereby
avoid economic injury;127 indirect purchasers lack standing to sue.128
The United States also allows automatic treble damages by statute 29
and liberal, party-initiated discovery by rule. 130
Consider now how effective the European model is likely to be
at achieving compensation, or in encouraging private antitrust
litigation at all. If European courts chase the harm downstream to the
ultimately injured party, they will find themselves with thousands or
even millions of parties to compensate in the ordinary antitrust case.
Not only will those parties be widely dispersed with many small
124. On this score, the EU position does not differ from the U.S. position. See Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (holding that, to survive the pleading stage, a complaint must
possess allegations "plausibly suggesting" an antitrust violation).
125. EU White Paper, supra note 4, at 5.
126. See Barak D. Richman & Christopher R. Murray, Rebuilding Illinois Brick: A
Functionalist Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 69, 90 (2007).
127. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 744-47 (1977).
128. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 492-94 (1968). But see
supra note 28 and accompanying text (noting that state antitrust law is not preempted from
allowing indirect purchaser suits and that some states have allowed such suits). Further, the
congressionally-appointed Antitrust Modernization Commission recently made a
recommendation for legislative reforms that would overrule both Hannover Shoe and Illinois
Brick and allow for removal of state cases to federal court and consolidation of all damages
claims as to a particular violation. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 265-78 (2007), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edulamc/report
recommendation/amc finalreport.pdf. The court would then make a determination of what the
total monopoly overcharge was, treble the overcharge, and allocate the damages pot to the
different plaintiffs based on the proportion of their individual injuries to the total. Id. at 270-78.
129. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
130. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
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injuries, they will also be denied the two features of the U.S. system-
generous claim aggregation and treble damages-that provide the best
opportunity for a suit to be brought and monies recovered. Further, if
the purchasers sue, they will face sharp limitations on discovery.
Discovery stinginess is particularly problematic in a system that gives
standing to downstream purchasers who are remote from the
defendant. Unlike the direct purchasers, who are often sophisticated
parties in contract with the defendant, the indirect purchasers may
know very little about the defendant's business and need generous
amounts of discovery to make their case.
Ironically, a primarily deterrence-oriented system, like that of
the United States, has less need of the very features of the U.S. civil
litigation system that continental systems often reject. It has less need
for claim aggregation since the direct purchasers are relatively fewer
in number and have more concentrated injuries. It has less need for
treble damages since the direct purchasers often have a sufficient
incentive to sue for even single damages. Finally, it has less need for
discovery since the direct purchasers often know much more about
defendant's business practices and conduct than do the downstream
purchasers.
None of this is to say that continental systems are wrong in
rejecting direct purchaser rules, class actions, treble damages, liberal
discovery, or other features of the U.S. system. Even where those
features are present, private antitrust litigation is not very successful
at achieving compensation or deterrence. Rather, the point is that if
compensation and deterrence have failed as objectives in the United
States, they are even more likely to fail in the European Union and in
other jurisdictions with similar legal regimes and cultures. Emerging
private enforcement jurisdictions have an expanded set of reasons to
resist implementation of a private enforcement system centered on
either compensation or deterrence. Before locking in a private
litigation system that inertia will later make difficult to change, these
jurisdictions would be well-advised to consider the failures of the U.S.
system at a foundational level and then proceed from a different
premise.
II. PROBLEM-SOLVING REMEDIES
Compensation and deterrence largely fail as goals of private
antitrust litigation, but that does not mean that the whole enterprise
should be abandoned. Instead, private enforcement should be
reoriented toward achieving an attainable objective-that is, using the
power of private litigation to frame private bargaining over problems
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of market power. Rather than looking backwards toward remediating
or punishing past bad acts, private antitrust enforcement should be
oriented toward the future by preventing exercises of market power
that harm consumers.
Importantly, this goal for private antitrust enforcement would
be broader than stimulating competition. To be sure, retaining
competitive markets should be an important goal. However, as
discussed next, the institutions of private antitrust enforcement have
been limited by a focus on competitive processes that ignores the
possibility that some markets simply will not be competitive. The
optimal system of private antitrust enforcement would create
mechanisms whereby competition would be fostered where possible
and the results of competitive markets simulated where competition
was unavailable in whole or in part.
A. An Institutional Challenge to Competition Absolutism
It is a virtually theological proposition that antitrust law
creates a national industrial policy founded on competition. The
Supreme Court has explained that "[t]he Sherman Act reflects a
legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only
lower prices, but also better goods and services. 'The heart of our
national economic policy long has been faith in the value of
competition.' "131 Within the antitrust community, it is heretical to
question the value of competition in creating lower prices and
spurring quality and innovation.
Yet many markets are uncompetitive, either temporarily or
semi-permanently. Sometimes, markets are not competitive because
dominant firms undertake identifiable bad acts to exclude or suppress
competition. More often, the cause is governmental intervention. For
example, the grant of a patent right on a pioneer drug without ready
substitutes often confers monopoly power on the drug maker for many
years. Similarly, complex regulatory schemes may serve as entry
barriers that keep out new competition for lengthy periods of time.132
Sometimes, markets are not competitive in a conventional sense
because they are natural monopolies. Natural monopolies include
markets where high fixed costs, network effects, or other features
131. Nat'1 Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (quoting Standard
Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951)).
132. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOx: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 347
(Free Press 1993) (1978) (observing that the "proliferation of regulatory and licensing authorities
at every level of government" has allowed governmental officials to "control and qualify the
would-be competitor's access to the marketplace").
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make it unlikely that more than one firm will be in the market at any
given time.133 In such cases, there may still be a form of competition in
play-Schumpeterian competition or "competition for the market"-
but a single dominant firm will still occupy the market for protracted
periods of time. 134 The computer operating system market at issue in
the Microsoft case may have had such characteristics. 1 35
At present, private antitrust litigation is oriented toward
locating bad acts that impair the competitiveness of markets. 136 Often,
this means either forcing competition on industrial functions not
suited to competition or else abandoning markets altogether, on the
theory that the lack of competitiveness is not the result of a bad act.
Private antitrust enforcement has thus fallen into the "splitting"
dilemma created by the crime-tort model. Under this model, an
industrial practice is either a sinner or a saint. Either the practice
violates the relevant legal norm (usually decided on a post hoc basis
during the course of litigation), in which case it is subjected to the
harsh penalty of treble damages, or else it is found to be "competition
on the merits," in which case it escapes any sanction whatsoever. This
harsh dualism leaves no middle ground for practical legal solutions to
market power problems.
Consider an archetypal problem in antitrust law, the joint
venture. Joint ventures between competitors are often efficiency-
enhancing devices that bring about tremendous consumer benefits by
standardizing interconnections, creating economies of scale or scope,
facilitating optimal planning, and spreading risk. On the other hand,
the aggregation of economic power in a joint venture can lead to the
133. See generally Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985) (cataloging instances where a product's utility
depends on the number of "network" users of the same product and explaining that the "central
feature of the market that determines the scope of the relevant network is whether the products
of different firms may be used together"); Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust
Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6-15 (2001) (detailing two methods of
understanding such continued periods of market dominance-network effects and
"Schumpeterian" Rivalry).
134. See Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & EcON. 55, 57 (1968) (critiquing
the natural monopoly theory by noting that rival bidders may still compete in market
negotiations, but implying that after contractual negotiations, only the winning bidder will
remain-a distinction between "competition for the field" and "competition within the field").
135. See United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 49-50 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting Microsoft's
argument that the operating system market is the type of dynamic, technological, innovation-
based market consuming academic debate over monopoly doctrine, but declining to determine
the validity of such a label).
136. See generally Crane, supra note 2, at 31-32 (detailing how "[m]ost antitrust litigation
remains a search for the elusive 'bad act' " and examining how this practice impacts the
monopolization offense from a theoretical standpoint).
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creation and exercise of market power.137 Suppose, for example, that a
joint venture reduces production costs by $100 and creates new
technologies that bring $100 in new consumer welfare. At the same
time, the contractual relationship between the producers also allows
them to exercise market power and raise prices $150 above the
competitive level. Under standard antitrust analysis, the joint venture
would probably be immunized from liability.138 Unless a plaintiff could
point to some bylaw or other practice that was (1) the cause of the
market power and (2) unnecessary to achieve the efficiencies, the joint
venture would almost certainly pass muster under the rule of reason
based on its net consumer welfare enhancement. 139
Suppose now that the total enhancement in consumer welfare
based on the production efficiencies and design innovation was $200,
but that the enhanced market power allowed the joint venture to raise
prices $250 above the competitive level. Now, the net effect on
consumers would be negative. The joint venture would be condemned
and treble damages owed.140
In neither case would the antitrust solution be optimal. In the
first case, the dualistic nature of the legal exercise would require
blessing a large amount of market power. In the second case, it would
require condemning a large amount of efficiencies. A far better
approach would be to allow the joint venture in both cases, but to
control the exercise of market power.
For a real-world example, consider the multi-billion dollar
antitrust litigation over payment systems that has been waged in
many courtrooms over the last decade.141 Payment systems like credit
or debit cards are two-sided markets, meaning that payment card
systems issue products demanded by two different but interrelated
137. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to Collaborations Among
Competitors, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1187-88 (2001) (discussing situations where joint ventures
create both efficiencies and market power).
138. I am assuming that at least $50 of the lower production costs are passed onto
consumers, which together with the $100 increase in consumer welfare from the technological
innovation makes consumers at least break even.
139. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION
148-49 (2005) (explaining steps in rule of reason analysis, including a final stage where
procompetitve effects may be balanced against anticompetitive effects).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 243 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming
trial court determination that anticompetitive effects of credit card system's exclusionary rule
outweighed its procompetitive effect).
141. See Steven Semeraro, Credit Card Interchange Fees: Three Decades of Antitrust
Uncertainty, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 941, 941-42 (2007) (explaining that in 2005 numerous
private antitrust cases "were consolidated before the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation"
where "potential damages [have been] said to exceed the annual pre-tax profit of the entire U.S.
banking industry").
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sets of clients, buyers and merchants.142 The payment systems are
ultimately indifferent as to whether the buyers or merchants pay for
the payment service, just as a newspaper is ultimately indifferent as
to whether its revenues come from subscriptions or advertising. An
antitrust intervention on one side of the market-for example, a
prohibition on "honor all cards" policiesl 43-may simply cause the
payment systems to exact their tolls from the other side of the market
by increasing fees to card carriers. Thus, the search for a bad act on
either side of the market may have unintended and harmful effects on
the other side of the market.
The situation is still more complicated because competition
within payment systems occurs along multiple vectors. Until their
recent initial public offerings, the Visa and MasterCard systems were
joint ventures owned by banks that also issued individually branded
credit and debit cards. 144 When a consumer swipes her credit card at a
retailer, two different banks within a payment system are
implicated.145 The merchant's bank (the "acquiring bank") must pay
an interchange fee to the consumer's bank (the "issuing bank").
Interchange fees are ultimately passed down to merchants; merchants
are unhappy because the fees are determined by bargaining between
competitor banks who, given their dual status as acquirers and
issuers, may not have very strong incentives to keep the rates low.14 6
Private antitrust litigants may weigh in and condemn the
setting of interchange fees as an unreasonable horizontal restraint.
Consider again what happens to the entire system if a particular
practice is categorically condemned. Costs are likely to reemerge at
some other juncture in the system, with potentially unfortunate
results. For example, to the extent that the payment system was
previously allocating fees to the less demand-elastic side of the
market, a shift to the other side of the market could lead to a
reduction in output.'47
Private antitrust litigation for damages between different
classes of interests and different judges and juries is not the way to
142. Benjamin Klein et al., Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Antitrust Economics of
Payment Card Interchange Fees, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 571 (2006).
143. Visa's and MasterCard's "honor all cards" policy required merchants that accepted Visa
and MasterCard credit cards to honor their debit cards as well. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 2005).
144. Klein et al., supra note 142, at 572.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 572-74.
147. Dennis W. Carlton & Alan S. Frankel, Transaction Costs, Externalities, and 'Two-
Sided" Payment Markets, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 617, 629, 637.
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address problems of market power in payment systems. The analytical
tools provided by the crime-tort model of private litigation do not lend
themselves to regulation of such a vast and complex enterprise. The
dualistic bottom line of private litigation-sinner or saint-does not
allow for the incremental fixes and accommodations necessary to
control the market power in the system without harming interests on
another side of the market.
One possible solution is comprehensive regulation by the
Federal Reserve. However, the centralized regulation of systems
capable of behaving competitively raises its own set of objections.
Alfred Kahn, the father of airline deregulation, admonished:
Regulated monopoly is a very imperfect instrument for doing the world's work. It suffers
from the evils of monopoly itself-the danger of exploitation, aggressively or by inertia,
the absence of pervasive external restraints and stimuli to aggressive, efficient and
innovative performance. Regulation itself tends inherently to be protective of monopoly,
passive, negative, and unimaginative .... Regulation is ill-equipped to treat the more
important aspects of performance fficiency, service innovation, risk taking, and
probing the elasticity of demand. Herein lies the great attraction of competition: it
supplies the direct spur and the market test of performance. 148
The dualism of antitrust's crime-tort orientation is often
considered the lesser evil in the juxtaposition of antitrust and
regulation. Antitrust law is the default rule imposing competitive
behavioral norms when the state does not intervene to regulate an
industry.149 Since regulation is often viewed with disfavor in market
economies, antitrust-the search for the bad act-is considered the
necessary path, even if that path sometimes results in an imperfect fit
between antitrust assumptions and market realities.
One need not quibble with the general preference for antitrust-
controlled competition over regulation to see the possibility of an
improvement in the status quo. The weaknesses of the current system
of private enforcement do not call for a transition to centralized
regulation. Rather, they are a reason to reconceptualize the role of
private enforcement altogether. A better-designed system of private
enforcement would seek to control market power where reasonable by
stimulating competition, and where full competition is impossible, by
controlling the exercise of market power. Unlike a governmental
148. 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS
325-26 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. 1988) (1971). Justice Breyer articulated a similar point of view,
explaining the various justifications and subsequent critiques for regulating the marketplace,
including the "existence of a 'natural monopoly.' " STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS
REFORM 15-35 (1982).
149. In Herbert Hovenkamp's words, antitrust is a "residual regulator" whose only "purpose
is to promote competition to the extent that market choices have not been preempted by some
alternative regulatory enterprise." HOVENKAMP, supra note 139, at 13.
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regulatory system supplying command-and-control rules, the system
would seek to incentivize and empower private actors to negotiate
individually tailored solutions. Antitrust law would provide the
backdrop for these negotiations by threatening judicial intervention in
the event that the parties cannot come to terms. Unlike the current
system, where judicial interventions are mostly backward-looking
determinations of whether damages are owed and, if so, how much,
the judicial interventions at issue would be forward-looking and
injunctive. In broad-brush terms, the threatened interventions could
include setting rates and prices, rewriting contracts, mandating access
to infrastructure, disbarring company managers, appointing outside
monitors, and requiring public disclosures.
The intuitive reaction to this suggestion may be alarm at the
prospect of delegating such broad, intrusive, and burdensome power to
judges. Of the three branches of government, the judiciary may be the
least well-suited to act as a rate regulator and an industrial captain.150
There is some appeal in the simplicity of judges or juries awarding
damages for past conduct and then washing their hands of the future.
Yet two important caveats should be heeded. First, interventions
should occur only in cases where the market itself has failed and there
is a reasonable prospect that judicial intervention would improve
matters. In economies characterized by efficient capital markets, high
rates of innovation, technological change, labor mobility, and
perpetual demographic change, the need for intervention should be
infrequent. Second, the more draconian interventions should be
merely threatened initially and then executed only in the event that
private bargaining in the court's shadow fails to produce a negotiated
outcome. The goal of private antitrust enforcement should not be to
have courts directly control market power. Instead, it should be to
have courts act as foils to market power.
So conceived, private litigation would not be preoccupied with
identifying past bad acts. Rather, it would be preoccupied with making
early and speedy interventions into market power problems and,
where necessary, laying down rules about how markets should behave
in the future. In some cases, this would entail tinkering with the
processes of competition to lower entry barriers and make markets
behave competitively. In other cases, it would focus not on the
150. See, e.g., Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 1991) (referring to rate-setting
as "a task [courts] are inherently unsuited to perform competently"); In re Coordinated Pretrial
Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 445 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The federal
courts generally are unsuited to act as rate-setting commissions."); Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979) (rejecting "judicial oversight of pricing
policies (that] would place the courts in a role akin to that of a public regulatory commission").
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processes of competition but directly on market outputs, on the terms
and conditions of trade. In the next section, one example of each of
these approaches is considered.
B. Examples of Effective Private Enforcement Mechanisms
1. Contractual Foreclosure
Many antitrust cases concern claims that certain contractual
terms foreclose competition. There are many different species of
potentially foreclosing contractual terms. A partial list includes tie-
ins, 151 exclusive dealing, 152 market share rebates, 153 bundled
discounts,154 loyalty clauses, 155 and volume discounts.15 6 These kinds of
contractual provisions have the potential to harm the competitiveness
of a market by requiring entry on a large scale or preventing smaller
rivals from reaching economies of scale that would permit them to act
as a meaningful constraint on the dominant incumbent.15 7 At the same
time, there are many procompetitive or competitively neutral reasons
for these kinds of contractual terms.15 8 The upshot of foreclosure is
lengthy, fact-intensive, and cumbersome litigation.
The usual course in such cases is something like the following:
The plaintiff, usually a new entrant, sues, claiming that it is in dire
risk of having to exit the market because of the defendant's
contractual practices. The defendant counters that the contractual
provisions in question bring benefits to customers; indeed, they may
151. Tying involves the seller of a monopoly product requiring the buyer to purchase a
second product as well.
152. Exclusive dealing involves contractual commitment to exclusivity in either buying or
selling.
153. Market share rebates are earned when a buyer makes specified percentages of its
purchases from the seller.
154. Bundled discounts are given in return for the buyer's agreement to make minimum
amounts of purchases in separate product categories.
155. There are various forms of loyalty clauses, all of which provide for one contractual party
to do business with the other to the exclusion of other potential parties. For example, the buyer
may commit to give its business to the seller so long as the seller matches the best price offered
by other sellers.
156. Volume discounts are given when a buyer reaches a certain level of purchases, either
units or dollars.
157. See Benjamin Klein, Exclusive Dealing as Competition for Distribution "On the Merits,"
12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119, 122 (2003) (explaining how exclusive dealing "will force existing
[non-exclusive] competitors and potential new entrants to operate at a cost disadvantage" and
may prevent their entry "until sufficient distribution becomes available").
158. See generally id. at 137-60 (detailing the efficiencies of exclusive dealing, such as
counteracting distributor "free-riding" and assisting manufacturers in contracting for distributor
promotion).
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have been requested by customers. The defendant also contends that
the reason the plaintiff failed is not because of the defendant's
contracts, but instead because of the poor quality of the plaintiffs
product. A threshold motion to dismiss may be granted, in which case
the entire case goes away. Otherwise, the parties hunker down into
years of discovery and expert disclosures, at the end of which the
defendant gets a last chance to avoid trial by moving for summary
judgment. If the motion is denied, the defendant pays out a large
monetary settlement but does not agree to modify its contractual
practices. Often, the contractual practices at issue have been mooted
by the expiration of the original contracts and subsequent market
developments.1 59
If the plaintiffs case is successful, or if it appears to have a
chance of succeeding, entrepreneurial class action lawyers will quickly
cobble together a class of purchasers in order to make a claim for
overcharges. If the class is not certified, the case vanishes. If the class
is certified, the defendant settles again without changing its practices.
Money changes hands, and the market moves on. 160
As noted earlier, there is little reason to believe that any of this
either results in meaningful compensation to antitrust law's intended
beneficiaries or deters other firm managers from engaging in similar
practices. Instead of looking backward to see if any such contract
violated antitrust law, it would be preferable for judges or
administrative agencies to entertain private claims with a view
toward prospectively restructuring contracts so as to allow the market
to behave competitively.161
For example, suppose that a defendant had contracts requiring
major customers to make 80 percent of their purchases from the
defendant in order to receive a particular level of discount. 162 Suppose
also that a hearing were held, limited to the questions of (1) the
procompetitive justifications for such market share discounts, (2) the
159. See, e.g., Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Group, L.P., No. CV 02-4770 MRP, 2006
WL 1236666, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2006) (upholding jury verdict against defendant based on
foreclosure effects of various contractual practices but declining to grant a permanent injunction
because the market had changed considerably in the interim).
160. These observations are not new. In 1966, Everette MacIntyre, an FTC Commissioner,
wrote an article bemoaning the duration, expense, and damages orientation of private antitrust
litigation and calling for a much greater focus on the possibility of injunctive remedies. Everette
MacIntyre, Antitrust Injunctions: A Flexible Private Remedy, 1966 DuKE L.J. 22. As noted
earlier, the duration of private damages litigation has substantially increased over the
intervening years. See supra notes 80-89and accompanying text.
161. This is assuming that there is an antitrust problem at all.
162. These are essentially the facts of Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039
(8th Cir. 2000).
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foreclosure effect on the plaintiff, and (3) the feasibility of contractual
modifications that would permit the plaintiff some breathing room in
the market without impairing the defendant's legitimate interests. A
judge might decide that some level of market share commitment was
justified, but that lowering the commitment to 70 percent would
achieve most of the same efficiencies without denying the plaintiff the
opportunity to reach minimum viable scale. In this event, the judge
might enjoin the defendant from denying any customer its contractual
discounts so long as it reached at least a 70 percent share, thus
effectively lowering the market share commitment by 10 percent.
Such a prospective-looking system would require some
statutory innovation. Under the present antitrust statutes, a judge
would not be justified in restructuring a contract unless she found a
violation of some section of the antitrust law. This all-or-nothing
nature of the search for a violation adds nothing but confusion,
burden, and time to antitrust proceedings. If the proposed system has
any chance of succeeding, it must be nimble and quick. It must strip
away the need for lengthy discovery and trials on questions of intent,
damages, history, and perhaps even the sinkhole of technical market
definition. The trial itself must focus on objective economic facts,
specifically the need for and feasibility of adjusting contractual terms
in order to remove entry barriers.
To be sure, more abbreviated proceedings than a full trial after
extensive discovery would entail some risk of error. However, the
incremental value of the information produced in traditional antitrust
discovery rarely exceeds the cost of the delay that damages actions
necessarily incur. Discovery often suffers from a severe case of
diminishing marginal returns. Most of the information produced in
discovery-beyond the relevant contracts, cost and revenue data, and
some basic business documents-is not very useful in determining the
ultimate economic questions necessary to correct market failures.
Thus, the comparative advantages of speedier determinations are
apparent.
An overriding objection to such a system might be that
coercively rewriting contracts is a regulatory, and not a judicial,
function. Nevertheless, judges do routinely rewrite contracts in order
to promote competition. One area where this occurs is in litigation
over the enforceability of covenants not to compete. Under common
law principles, covenants not to compete are only enforceable to the
extent reasonably necessary to promote the employer's legitimate
interests.163 While some courts follow an all-or-nothing approach,
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981).
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under which a covenant not to compete is either entirely enforceable
or entirely unenforceable, a majority of courts follow some version of
the "blue pencil" doctrine, which allows a judge to rewrite an
overbroad covenant so as to be reasonable. 164 Judges, as lawyers by
training, are familiar with the structure and meaning of contracts and
may be better able to modify contracts than other business
relationships.
Suppose, however, that judges should not be in the business of
rewriting contracts in order to achieve competition objectives, because
the necessary technical understanding to do so escapes the average
judge. This is actually a broader argument against generalist judges
assuming jurisdiction over complex antitrust cases and would mean
that judges should not award damages for antitrust violations
either.1 65 Assuming this argument is correct, it merely suggests
shifting the contract-policing function to the Federal Trade
Commission or another expert body. Since the remedy would be an
injunction rather than monetary damages, there is nothing to prevent
the FTC from acting as an administrative body to scrutinize
contractual terms.166 During the political wrangling leading up to the
creation of the FTC, there were proposals to give the FTC power to
approve or disapprove large corporate contracts.167 A less ambitious
role for the FTC could include some sort of exhaustion of
administrative remedies system, whereby any competitor unhappy
with an exclusionary contract would have to go through an
administrative process before bringing an action in court. This
administrative proceeding could result in an administrative law judge
recommending contractual modifications that, if adopted by the
defendant, would bar the plaintiff from bringing a damages action in
court.
Further, even assuming that both judges and administrative
agencies are far inferior to contractual parties in drafting contracts,
the adoption of a forward-looking private remedy system need not
entail extensive contract rewriting by judges or administrative
164. Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An Argument for Specificity in
Noncompete Agreements, 86 NEB. L. REV. 672, 682-89 (2008).
165. See Crane, supra note 1, at 1216-20 (explaining that "generalist judges struggle to keep
up with antitrust's economic density").
166. Proposals to give the FTC power to award damages have been unsuccessful. See
Stephen Calkins, Civil Monetary Remedies Available to Federal Antitrust Enforcers, 40 U.S.F. L.
REV. 567, 580 n.59 (2006) (describing a failed bill "expressly authoriz[ing] the Commission to
seek consumer redress after entry of a Commission cease and desist order"). Given the general
view that civil antitrust claims entail a Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury, allowing the
FTC to award compensatory damages for antitrust violations might be unconstitutional.
167. Crane, supra note 2, at 16-18.
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agencies in most cases. Just as most private damages actions are
either dismissed by the courts or settled,168 most private injunctive
actions would be dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiff was not
really foreclosed from competing or else resolved through a negotiated
settlement between the parties. The difference from damages
litigation would be the speed with which the matter could be brought
to resolution-months rather than years-and the nature of the
agreed-upon remedy-contractual modification enhancing the
competitiveness of the market rather than payments shifting money
between pockets.
The solutions to contractual foreclosure are often relatively
simple. Consider one recent example. Beginning in the 1990s, Johnson
& Johnson ("J&J") entered into contracts with Group Purchasing
Organizations ("GPOs") that offered hospitals substantial discounts on
endo products and sutures if the hospitals bought minimum amounts
of their requirements in different product categories from J&J.169 A
medical products company that did not offer a full line of comparable
products sued, claiming that the bundled discounts foreclosed its
ability to compete because it could not match the discount on J&J's
full product line.170 As soon as the competitor sued, J&J modified its
contractual formula to make the market share formula inapplicable to
competitors that did not offer a full product line.171 After this simple
contractual modification, J&J's bundled discount system remained
functional as a competitive device against J&J's full-line competitor
Tyco, but had no further exclusionary effect on small rivals since
purchases from smaller rivals would no longer count in determining
whether hospitals had met their market share requirements. 7 2 The
court granted summary judgment in favor of J&J on the claims
related to these contracts, noting that the contractual modification
had solved the foreclosure problem.173
It is tempting to view the J&J story as evidence that the threat
of treble damages has a salutary deterrent effect on exclusionary
conduct, but that would be the wrong conclusion. J&J did not modify
its contracts until its competitor sued and did so then only to score
168. About three quarters of private antitrust cases are involuntarily dismissed, almost a
quarter settle, and just two percent are resolved through a trial. Id. at 35 n. 188.
169. See Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., No. SACVO31329JVSMLGX, 2006 WL
1381697, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2006) (explaining Johnson & Johnson's purchase agreements
with the Group Purchasing Organizations).
170. Id.
171. Id. at *3-4.
172. Id.
173. Id. at *4.
2010]1 713
HeinOnline  -- 63 Vand. L. Rev. 713 2010
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
litigation points. J&J's switch in time did not stop the litigation from
continuing for at least three more years; the court denied summary
judgment on a number of other allegedly exclusionary contractual
practices. The lesson to draw is that the fixes for contractual exclusion
are often simple and could be administered prospectively without
excessive complexity or delay.
2. Liability Rules for Dominant Intellectual Property
Contractual foreclosure situations call for antitrust
intervention to restructure contractual commitments and open the
market to vigorous competition. Occasionally, antitrust intervention
cannot create competitive market conditions without impairing the
optimal functioning of an industry. A case in point is the increasing
clash between intellectual property and antitrust. At their core, both
antitrust and intellectual property law share a commitment to
enhancing consumer welfare by spurring innovation, efficiency, and
low prices.174 Yet the processes by which intellectual property and
antitrust seek to achieve these goals sometimes appear to be in
conflict. 75 Intellectual property law tends to grant inventors and
creators exclusive rights, which often appear monopolistic, in order to
provide incentives to engage in inventive or creative activity. 76
Antitrust law seeks to break down exclusivity and monopoly in order
to foster competition.
A standard antitrust approach to problems of market power in
intellectual property is something like the following: A judge or an
agency first determines whether the defendant has market power. If
so, the next question is whether that power derives from the grant of
intellectual property rights or from violations of antitrust law. If it
arises from the former, antitrust intervention is at an end since
intellectual property rights are creatures of statute that judges and
antitrust enforcers may not second-guess. Of course, sometimes judges
174. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 1 (2007), available
at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf ("Over the past several decades, antitrust
enforcers and the courts have come to recognize that intellectual property laws and antitrust
laws share the same fundamental goals of enhancing consumer welfare and promoting
innovation.").
175. Id. (noting apparent conflict between antitrust and intellectual property because of
"intellectual property law's grant of exclusivity," which was seen as conflicting with "antitrust
law's attack on monopoly power").
176. In Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., the Supreme Court finally brought
to an end a long-standing presumption that patents and copyrights used in contractual tie-ins
entailed market power. 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
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and antitrust enforcers mistakenly attribute the defendant's market
power to antitrust violations, even though that power is inherent in
the grant of the patent, copyright, or trademark. Fearing such
inadvertent interference with creative and inventive incentives,
judges often act with extra caution in applying antitrust law to
intellectual property-laden industries.177
The reason for this sometimes excessive caution has a lot to do
with the fact that antitrust law, and in particular private antitrust
law, is heavy artillery. For example, granting an award of treble
damages based on the claim that a patentee had redesigned a
patented product in a predatory manner entails a very serious risk of
chilling design innovation, one of the very things that both antitrust
and patent law seek to stimulate.s78 Therefore, judges are reluctant to
find antitrust liability on this basis. 79 Similarly, most U.S. judges
refuse to assign antitrust liability for the refusal to share intellectual
property, on the theory that refusing to share is inherently part of the
bundle of intellectual property rights and compelling firms to license
could chill innovative activity.180
Consider now an alternative approach to private antitrust
enforcement that looks not to the past, but instead to the future. The
goal with respect to intellectual property would be to decide whether
the intellectual property rights ("IPR") holder should be obliged to
change any of its commercial practices going forward. Note that the
goal cannot be to strip all of the market power from the IPR holder.
This is because market power sometimes serves as the reward
necessary for the invention to have been created. The proper goal of
antitrust enforcement should be to strip away excessive market power,
which was not inherent in the grant of the IPR because it was
unnecessary ex ante for the stimulation of the inventive activity.18
177. See, e.g., Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003)
(justifying permissive rule on patent settlements on ground that, given the threat of treble
damages, more aggressive antitrust intervention would "impair the incentives for disclosure and
innovation").
178. 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION § 705b (rev. ed. 1996) (asserting "no
administrable rule [governing predatory product design] could be fashioned that would not exact
an unreasonably heavy toll").
179. For a court deeply divided on this issue, see C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc., 157
F.3d 1340, 1370-72 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
180. E.g., In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1329 (10th Cir. 2000)
("Xerox's refusal to sell or license its copyrighted works was squarely within the rights granted
by Congress to the copyright holder and did not constitute a violation of the antitrust laws.").
181. See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1813, 1817 (1984) (examining the implications of the patent-antitrust conflict).
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The trouble is that stripping away excessive market power is
not the same as creating a competitive market. This is where antitrust
law often falls into serious conceptual difficulty. Because the current
structure of antitrust thinking is binary (violation / no violation), it
takes some imagination to contemplate a world in which a judge
intervenes to correct an IPR holder's excessive market power without
hoping to create a competitive market. Tinkering with degrees of
market power seems a job for a legislator or a regulator, not a judge.
Yet such judicial tinkering already occurs within the discipline
of intellectual property law and occasionally within antitrust law.
Cases in point are the consent decrees that govern the American
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers ("ASCAP") and
Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI"). ASCAP and BMI are performance
rights organizations ("PROs") which serve as clearing houses that
aggregate and license millions of individual artists' performance
rights.182 In the 1940s and 1960s, the Justice Department brought suit
against the PROs on antitrust grounds and resolved both actions by
consent decree. 183 Under the consent decrees, BMI and ASCAP must
make through-to-the-listener licenses available for public
performances of their music repertoires and provide applicants with
proposed license fees upon request. If the PROs and the applicant
cannot agree on a fee, either party may apply to the rate court for the
determination of a reasonable fee. 184 The consent decrees with the
PROs thus establish a system of private antitrust enforcement that is
focused on the future.
When an antitrust court intervenes to set a rate for music
licensed by ASCAP or BMI, it does not create a competitive market.
ASCAP and BMI continue to have immense market power. Rather,
the court effectively acts as a rate regulator, allowing BMI, ASCAP,
and the artists they represent to set a price that reflects the
exclusivity rights granted by Congress but not any incremental
market power from the aggregation of multiple copyrights. Deterrence
and compensation, the two ostensible goals of private antitrust
enforcement, are nowhere to be found.
182. The economic justifications for the BMI and ASCAP system are discussed in Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 6 (1979).
183. See Amended Final Judgment, United States v. ASCAP, 1950 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (explaining that the Justice Department filed its complaint on February
26, 1941); Amended Final Judgment, United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 1966 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), modified by 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,378 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(explaining that the United States filed its complaint in 1964).
184. United States v. Broadcast Music, 426 F.3d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 2005).
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This sort of regulatory policing of market power in intellectual
property does not have to occur within the ambit of an antitrust
consent decree. Indeed, tools are available within intellectual property
law itself for such private policing to happen routinely. An issue
currently being debated is whether courts should grant injunctions
against infringement of IPRs or whether they should instead award
the IPR holders royalties for the infringement. 185 In their seminal
work, Guido Calabresi and Doug Melamed showed that economic
interests can be protected under either property rules or liability
rules.186 A court concerned that an IPR's commercial practices were
creating excessive market power might decide to treat the IPR as a
liability right rather than a property right, deny the IPR holder an
injunction, and then require "trespassers" to pay the IPR holder a
royalty reflecting the value of the IPR stripped of the excessive market
power.' 87
If this seems like an overly regulatory regime, consider the fact
that many IPR holders are voluntarily opting into such regimes in
order to escape the heavy hand of conventional antitrust liability.
Many standard setting organizations ("SSOs") have bylaws requiring
participants to license their patents on reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms. 88 A primary motivation for such
abandonment of property protections in favor of a liability regime is
185. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Cosean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1032 (1995) ("[S]how[ing] that liability rules
possess an 'information-forcing' quality that property rules do not."); Mark A. Lemley & Philip J.
Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 785 (2007)
(examining whether a property rule or a liability rule is more appropriate); Robert P. Merges, Of
Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2655 (1994) ("In my
view, property rules can do work effectively in many situations involving IPRs."); Henry E.
Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J.
1742, 1818-20 (2007) (examining when injunctions are appropriate in intellectual property
cases); Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property Rights,
106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1319-33 (2008) (discussing the merits of injunctive relief).
186. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972). Property rules
entail the right to bar the trespasser and liability rules entail the right to make the trespasser
pay a fee for its use. Id.
187. In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's
presumption in favor of a permanent injunction when patent infringement has been proven. 547
U.S. 388, 391 (2006). However, in separate concurring opinions, the Justices displayed very
different attitudes toward the frequency with which permanent injunctions should be granted.
Id. at 394-95. I explore these issues at greater length in Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability,
88 TEX. L. REV. 253 (2009).
188. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90
CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1893 (2002).
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the avoidance of antitrust liability. 89 Similarly, participants in patent
pools often agree to liability rules not simply to promote efficient
exchange of rights, but because of antitrust pressures. 190 Patent
pooling has faced a long history of antitrust challenges, 191 and
patentees often hope to avoid antitrust suits by agreeing to license on
reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. SSOs and patent pools
create private systems that have the potential to be far more effective
at policing market power than the current crime-tort system.
A common objection to liability-rule treatment for intellectual
property is that it forces judges into an uncomfortable rate-setting
role.192 To be sure, judges would occasionally have to intervene. But
the goal of such a system would be to set the stage for private
bargaining over royalty rates for intellectual property in a context
where the licensees held a credible threat to counter the licensor's
implicit hold-out threat. Since a judge would theoretically assign a
royalty rate that stripped the excessive market power out of the IPRs
and neither party could predict exactly what the judge would view as
excessive, both parties would have an incentive to bargain toward a
reasonable royalty rate. The mere threat of a rate-setting proceeding
would curtail the IPR's ability to charge an excessive rate.193
This is not idle speculation. In a recent study, I examined fifty-
two antitrust consent decrees that contained liability-rule provisions
for patents or copyrights.194 In essence, these provisions required the
defendants to license their patents or copyrights on reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms and reserved jurisdiction for the court to set
189. Justin Hurwitz, The Value of Patents in Industry Standards: Avoiding License Arbitrage
with Voluntary Rules, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 4 (2008) (noting that the "root of the [RAND
commitment] problem lies in antitrust law").
190. See Daniel A. Crane, Patent Pools, RAND Commitments, and the Problematics of Price
Discrimination, in WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 5-6
(Harry First et al. eds., forthcoming 2010).
191. See 2 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AS APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 34.3 (2d ed. 2010) (examining the
evolution of Supreme Court jurisprudence on patent pools); Robert P. Merges, Institutions for
Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 123, 123-65
(Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) (explaining the history and importance of patent pools).
192. See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 64-69, United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 332 U.S.
319 (1947) (No. 89), 1947 WL 44396 (explaining that a liability-rule treatment would impose on
the courts "an onerous and absorbing administrative burden").
193. See Daniel A. Crane, Bargaining in the Shadow of Rate-Setting Courts, 76 ANTITRUST
L.J. 207, 208 (2009) (describing " 'jurisdiction retention' judgments," which do not necessarily
involve a court in ever setting a rate" but create a "threat of rate setting').
194. Id. at 311-12.
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the rate in the event that the parties could not agree. 95 In only three
out of fifty-two cases was the district court ever called on to set a
rate.196 In only one case, ASCAP, did a substantial amount of activity
appear.197 Between 1950 and 2009, the Southern District of New York
has set rates for ASCAP about eight times, which is a significant
amount of activity compared to other cases, but still a relatively small
number compared to the magnitude of ASCAP's licensing activities,
the length of time at issue, and the pervasiveness of the consent
decree in regulating ASCAP's activities.198 In most cases, the private
bargaining over copyright or patent royalty rates happened quietly in
the shadow of the rate-setting courts.199
A private enforcement system focused on limiting future
exercises of market power in intellectual property would be much
more effective than the current damages-oriented system. This is
particularly true given that many intellectual property-intensive
industries are subject to rapid change and innovation. The current
system of private litigation is too slow and cumbersome to keep up.
III. THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
It is perhaps overly optimistic to hope that private antitrust
enforcement will ever look much beyond deterrence and compensation.
Jurisdictions around the world are beginning to move cautiously in
the direction of private enforcement, usually justifying their
195. The following consent decree language-from a rare case in which the district court
actually did set a rate-is typical:
Upon application for a license under the provisions of this Section, the
defendant to whom application is made shall state the royalty which it deems
reasonable for the patents to which the application pertains. If the parties
are unable to agree upon a reasonable royalty, the defendant may apply to
this Court for the determination of a reasonable royalty, giving notice thereof
to the applicant and the Attorney General, and he shall make such
application forthwith upon request of the applicant. In any such proceeding,
the burden of proof shall be upon the defendant to whom application is made
to establish by a fair preponderance of evidence, a reasonable royalty, and the
Attorney General shall have the right to be heard thereon.
United States v. Am. Optical Co., 95 F. Supp. 771, 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
196. Crane, supra note 193, at 312.
197. Id. at 311.
198. Id. at 310.
199. A similar result occurs with respect to statutory copyright licenses. Copyright Royalty
Judges, who have statutory jurisdiction to set copyright rates for compulsory licenses, have to
exercise their powers relatively infrequently. More often, the parties bargain to a mutually
agreeable solution in the shadow of the copyright judges. See Crane, supra note 187, at 295
("[Clopyright judges (in various incarnations) have only had to set rates relatively
infrequently.").
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movements on the grounds of compensation and deterrence and
providing for damages as the essence of the private remedy. 200 The
current system of private antitrust litigation is a big business for
lawyers on both sides and many other stakeholders in the United
States. Most importantly, the current system is not so obviously
broken that there is great demand for reform. Billions of dollars flow
from defendants to "victims," so compensation seems to be working;
the payments also appear to send a message to potential offenders. 201
Still, hope remains for modest, incremental reforms in the United
States and for more robust experimentation in the developing
antitrust world.
A. U.S. Reforms
The best hope for reform in the United States lies in testing
and proving forward-looking remedies on a small scale. Take, for
example, the possibility of liability-rule treatment for dominant
intellectual property. As noted above, in settings like patent pools and
SSOs members of intellectual property-intensive industries are
already creating private liability-rule systems where IPR holders
commit to licensing on reasonable and nondiscriminatory ("RAND")
terms. There is some question, however, about the effectiveness of
such remedies. From the perspective of the potential licensee, such
commitments may be of limited value because some doubt exists that
the administrative processes chosen by the venturers will be
impartial.202 There is also uncertainty about the value of the RAND
commitment to the venturers since merely committing to RAND
licensing will not necessarily prevent an antitrust lawsuit if the
customer is disgruntled by the outcome of the private rate-setting
process. 203
One way to build a more robust and valuable RAND system
would be to create a statutory "gold standard" for RAND adjudications
which could include measures for ensuring independence and
transparency in expert determinations on licensing terms or terms of
sale. Licensors and sellers that committed to following the statutory
protocols could be granted immunity from antitrust suit for any
200. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
201. See Lande & Davis, supra note 35, at 893-98 (finding that "private enforcement is
significantly more effective at deterring illegal behavior than DOJ criminal antitrust suits").
202. Crane, supra note 190, at 25.
203. Id.
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matters within the scope of the RAND commitment, thus substituting
an administrative process for binary antitrust adjudication.204
RAND "gold standard" legislation of this nature could
eventually displace much private antitrust litigation in intellectual
property-intensive industries by making the terms and conditions of
access to intellectual property the subject of private, forward-looking
arbitration and bargaining. Initially, however, it would merely offer
an optional bypass to conventional antitrust litigation. If it proved
successful at mediating questions of market power in intellectual
property, it could serve as a valuable precedent in considering other
forward-looking remedies.
Similarly, other small-scale and initially optional reforms could
validate the concept of forward-looking private remedies and
stimulate interest in broader statutory innovations. The challenge for
those interested in reforming private antitrust litigation is to create
simple, workable models of future-oriented remedies that provide
incentives to the relevant stakeholders to bargain toward mutually
beneficial solutions to market power problems. As such models are
tried and proved on a small scale, they will provide hope for broader
reforms.
B. Experimentation in the Developing Antitrust World
The principal obstacle to the development of optimal private
litigation systems in the developing antitrust world is the
conceptualization of antitrust as an ordinary civil wrong, essentially
as a species of glorified tort. With this conceptualization in mind,
antitrust reformers often set out to graft competition policy onto the
existing civil litigation structures with a cautionary principle in mind:
Avoid replicating the out-of-control U.S. antitrust system. 205 Since the
204. Under the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-237, 118 Stat. 661 (2004), participants in standards development activities enjoyed limited
antitrust immunities. Their activities within the scope of the standardization processes are
subject to the rule of reason and not per se illegal and they may not be sued for treble damages,
but only single damages. However, the statute does not expressly reach-and its legislative
history suggests that it was not intended to reach-negotiations over patent licensing. See 150
CONG. REC. H3657 (daily ed. June 2, 2004) (Congress "further encourages discussion among
intellectual property rights owners and other interested standards participants regarding the
terms under which relevant intellectual property rights would be made available for use in
conjunction with the standard or proposed standard.").
205. The disdain that many foreign governments hold for private U.S. antitrust litigation
was barely concealed in a series of amicus curiae briefs filed in the U.S. Supreme Court on behalf
of a number of foreign governments arguing that foreign purchasers from international cartels
should not be permitted to sue in U.S. courts, an issue decided as the foreign governments
desired in F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran SA, 542 U.S. 155 (2004). See, e.g., Brief for
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U.S. system is the only fully developed private antitrust system and
addresses, successfully or unsuccessfully, all of the essential friction
points-standing, claim aggregation, damages, discovery, fee-shifting,
etc.-the process of implementing a private antitrust system often
resembles a simultaneous copying and erasing exercise. As evidenced
by the European Commission's White Paper, 206 the resulting private
enforcement systems often have little chance of meeting their
ostensible goals.
The key to avoiding the pitfalls of the U.S. system is to start
with a different set of premises about what private enforcement is and
why it should exist. Instead of imagining antitrust as creating a
sociolegal norm susceptible to violation and redress by private parties,
emerging jurisdictions should instead imagine antitrust as an
administrative process designed to limit inefficient exercises of market
power.207 Within this framework, the goal of private enforcement
would be to empower firms and individuals to negotiate problems of
market power either directly in, or in the shadow of, legal or
administrative proceedings.
In many ways, this problem-solving approach should be easier
to implement in jurisdictions that do not generally regulate
commercial behavior through an adversarial, rights-based system as
the United States does. Also, since much of the resistance to the U.S.
model concerns the magnitude of damages awards, 208 it should be
easier to sell private enforcement models that avoid damages
windfalls and coercive monetary settlements. In short, an enhanced
private enforcement system that breaks the governmental monopoly
over enforcement, without entailing the perceived or real pitfalls of
the U.S. litigation system, has considerable appeal in many emerging
antitrust jurisdictions.
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ireland, and the Kingdom of The
Netherlands as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 13 (No. 03-724) (quoting Smith Kline &
French Labs Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730 (C.A. 1982) ("As a moth is drawn to the light, so
is a litigant drawn to the United States. If he can only get his case into their courts, he stands to
win a fortune.")); Brief of the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 11, 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724) (asserting that "controversial
features of the U.S. legal system include extensive discovery, jury trials, class actions, contingent
fees, and punitive damages.").
206. See supra notes 9-10, 111-112 and accompanying text.
207. See Crane, supra note 1, at 1159 ('The technocratic shift begun by the political elite
could be furthered by a variety of reforms, including separating cartel enforcement from other
antitrust enforcement, moving from adjudication to administration, and granting FTC norm-
creation powers.").
208. See supra notes 126-130 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that private antitrust enforcement
generally fails to achieve compensation for victims of antitrust
violations and provides a significantly lesser degree of deterrence than
most commentators assume. The failure of the compensation and
deterrence goals in private antitrust is caused in part by specific
features of antitrust law and the harms it aims to cure, including the
widely dispersed nature of the economic harm, the indeterminacy of
technological innovation, and the complexity of the legal questions
adjudicated. These features and harms create cumbersome and
ponderous adjudicatory proceedings. However, antitrust law's failure
to achieve its compensation and deterrence goals may also have
relevance for other areas of economic and commercial regulation that
share similar features-perhaps including mass torts, RICO
violations, and securities fraud. Similarly, the problem-solving
approach to private antitrust enforcement proposed in this Article
may have analogues in other regulatory domains.
Within the antitrust domain, it is time for a hard look at the
reasons justifying private antitrust enforcement. In particular, it is
important to distinguish between aspirations and realities. It would be
wonderful if private antitrust enforcers achieved compensation for
injured victims and deterred future violations. Alas, they usually do
not, nor are there realistic fixes that could enable them to do so. In the
United States, this means going back to the drawing board to
reconceive the purposes of private antitrust. In the developing
antitrust world, this means answering the existential questions before
drafting legislation on technical implementation.
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